What we should have learned is this:
The development, production and use -- or threatened use -- of
nuclear weapons is a vicious cycle. Weapons of mass destruction
don't buy greater security. They don't bring stability. Mutually
Assured Destruction didn't end the cold war. The escalation of
nuclear arsenals stopped when the perception of hostility and
threat was diminished, buffered by a global perception of the moral
and political limitations of nuclear weapons as tools of
diplomacy.
It's especially important that we remember those lessons now, as
the world community ponders a war which is allegedly against
weapons of mass destruction.
War on Iraq would bring enormous financial benefit to western
oil interests, and we remain convinced that US strategy is not only
about routing terrorism or stopping weapons of mass destruction but
also about dominating fossil fuel supplies.. But let's take, for
the moment, the argument on its own merit, that the US is going
after Iraq out of fear of the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons.
Greenpeace has opposed the development, production and use of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction since its
inception more than 30 years ago. The testing and production of
nuclear weapons has already wreaked havoc on ecosystems and human
health; the use of nuclear weapons by accident or through conflict
could spell -- at best -- severely radioactive sacrifice zones with
many thousands of people affected, or at its worst -- the end of
our planet's ability to sustain life as we know it.
We believe that nuclear disarmament by all nations is a
fundamental prerequisite of a sustainable future for Earth in the
21st century. It is therefore imperative that the international
community - including the Bush Administration -tackle the question
of nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament in a coherent
manner.
A full-scale attack on the nation of Iraq for seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons would be without precedent. The US did not threaten
to attack Israel, India or Pakistan for acquiring nuclear
weapons.
There are three military strategies available to prevent
proliferation: counter-proliferation strikes, nuclear deterrence,
and military assault to create a "regime change". All are
flawed.
Military counter-proliferation -- the Israeli strike on Iraq's
Osirak reactor in 1981 is an example -- may deal temporarily with
the technical manifestations of proliferation,yet it raised the
very tensions which drive weapons programs in the first place.
They're also only as good as the intelligence they're based on. In
the case of Iraq, the IAEA dismantled a clandestine programme to
obtain nuclear weapons. If the US believes that the threat of a
military counter-proliferation response is an effective deterrent,
how can the US claim that Iraq has relaunched that clandestine
programme?
If nuclear deterrence was a viable strategy, it would be working
now. In Cold War logic, deterrence would dictate that Iraq -- or
any other state -- would be cowed by the overwhelming superiority
of the US nuclear arsenal and military machine. This clearly isn't
the case. For a regime facing destruction whether it uses a nuclear
weapon or not, even a single nuclear strike is easily rationalised
as legitimate self-defence, and an appropriate response against a
nuclear-armed aggressor. Can the US successfully disarm Iraq by
invading the country, taking over its infrastructure, and placing a
puppet regime in power? Possibly. Will a regime change bring peace
to the region and deter other states or agents from pursuing
weapons of mass destruction? Of course not. Quite the opposite.
Take Iran. It's a country with a chequered history of relations
with the US. It's politically inconvenient for the US to notice at
the moment that Iran is also moving swiftly toward nuclear
capability, just as it was politically inconvenient for the US to
note Saddam Hussein's use of biological weapons against his own
people in a different time. To Iran, the lesson of an invasion on
Iraq will be to ensure the swift development of its own weapons of
mass destruction, and to develop them while America is focused
elsewhere.
Military strategies will not succeed. A toolbox of responses is
required, but clearly the first and fundamental question is one of
leadership and political will. President Bush has said that the
real issue in Iraq is not the acceptance of UN weapons inspectors,
but verifiable disarmament. This is true. The problem is the
enormous inconsistency of such a statement coming from the
possessor of more then six thousand nuclear warheads.
The formal non-proliferation regime has been undermined year
after year by the "official" nuclear weapon states, which by their
behaviour clearly show they believe nuclear weapons are necessary
for their security. The nuclear weapons states have effectively
thumbed their noses at the United Nations and international
agreements with an alacrity equal to that of Iraq's.
The US and the other "official" nuclear weapon states have legal
obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. They should be
leading by example. Instead, the US Senate has refused to ratify
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Bush administration has
undermined the proposed verification protocol of the Biological
Weapons Convention. And arms control with Russia has devolved into
politically convenient bilateral deal-making rather than
transparent, legally binding and verifiable disarmament agreements
that actually destroy nuclear weapons.
The Bush Administration cannot reinforce the non-proliferation
norm by edict. It cannot act with any credible authority to
eliminate the weapons of mass destruction of others without
addressing its own. The case against these weapons must be a moral
one, not a strategically convenient one.
Second, diplomacy. Pressure from other Arab states as well as
western countries is clearly important, particularly as a
contribution to a more effective and positive US Middle East
policy. Solving the Palestinian issue is a necessary prerequisite
for any movement by Israel to join negotiations on weapons of mass
destruction in the region. The US can play a key role in resolving
that conflict.
Thirdly, containment followed by engagement. Continued pressure
on Iraq must include a comprehensive approach to the problem of the
proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how, particularly but
not exclusively from Russia. There must be a containment of the
feasibility of the weapons programme. But there must also be a
containment of the ambition behind it. Furthermore effective
measures need to be taken to stop the spread of weapons usable
material ,and technology, thus further reducing the threat.
Ultimately, what we need is a new theory of deterrence when it
comes to nuclear weapons. At its root, deterrence is and always has
been a matter of perception: the perception of threat, imagined
response, and a close calculation of exactly what either of two
combatants believe they can get away with.
Morality and what's deemed acceptable behaviour by states and
their leaders is also a perception, and one which changes over
time. As we move toward a globalisation of civil society, we need
to build a world-wide moral deterrence against the possession of
nuclear weapons. The cornerstone of any state's claim to moral
authority, and any leader's, must be based on their accountability
to civil society. They must abide by global agreements for the
global good, they must conform to the most global definitions of
acceptable behaviour.
The ability of a state to exert its will upon the world
community should be measured in its demonstrable commitment to the
common benefit of that community. The authority of its leaders, at
home and abroad, must rest in a new, global and inclusive
definition of the public trust. That would mean nuclear weapon
states would commit to, and begin, the process of eliminating their
nuclear weapons in the certain knowledge that such weapons are
incompatible with sane and sustainable security policies from a
global perspective.
Any state thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons would have to
be deterred by the strength of global repugnance -- at both the
state and individual levels, to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Any leader driving a state in that direction must know that they
will face a credible worldwide outrage,untainted by hypocritical
inconsistencies, and with a moral authority that will be daunting
to their futures as leaders, domestically and abroad. This moral
outrage needs to be effectively backed by agreed obstacles and
sanctions that can be applied in an impartial and objective
manner.
It is evident that the Bush Administration is unenthusiastic
about the use of multilaterialism in general and the United Nations
in particular as tools for conflict resolution, preferring instead
to use its military power to ensure that its strategic objectives
are met. This is perhaps the biggest challenge for the
international community of the 21st century. We can no longer
afford to continue as a planet made up of self-interested nations
and national leaders. A world in peril needs world leaders,
accountable to the needs and moral imperatives of our common
future.
If every inhabitant of Earth were a voter, what future would
nuclear weapons have in a global plebiscite on their
elimination?