A Shifting Agenda, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Counter-Proliferation and Disarmament

Download document

Executive summary: In contrast to measurable progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, counter-proliferation efforts have recently received priority, extensive resources and attention, and an expectation of universal participation. The variety, complexity, magnitude, and speed of development and implementation of recent counter-proliferation efforts suggest that today counter-proliferation overshadows and is being promoted at the expense of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues on the international agenda. Counter-proliferation addresses proliferation that has occurred, or is occurring, and as such replaces non-proliferation, which, as embraced in the NPT, is aimed against all proliferation, by all States, including both horizontal and vertical. However, the type of counter-proliferation that has been aggressively promoted by the United States since 2001 and embraced by the United Kingdom amongst others, concentrates exclusively on the prevention of horizontal proliferation. It not only critically undermines the NPT framework, but in its embracing of pre-emptive measures, it also undermines the norms of international law.It is indicative of the reach of the counter-proliferation approach that its “preventive” measures are often framed as part of “non-proliferation” rather than “counter-proliferation” efforts within the US.. However, the same measures are generally regarded internationally as counter-proliferation efforts. Such discrepancies of perception in the role and reach of counter-proliferation efforts are indicative of the shifting non-proliferation agenda: the US approach is pushing the agenda away from disarmament and even from non-proliferation as it has been understood. More active military approaches framed as preventive and towards selective prevention of access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) usable materials are instead being promoted and promulgated. Together the US National Security Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review reflect a security doctrine of counter-proliferation based on the use of the military which even extends to the option of taking pre-emptive action before threats emerge.The context in which the United States has pursued its counter-proliferation efforts is set out in the “New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD” announced by US President Bush in February 2004. Within a year, these measures have been, or are being implemented actively, and they are shaping the agenda of the non-proliferation regime and the work of the IAEA. This accelerated pace of non-proliferation activities has been driven by a deliberate shift in stated policy since September 2001. The approach to international security and international law embodied in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other counter-proliferation initiatives has been shaped in part by US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, (the “architect of PSI”) has asserted that an extended right of pre-emptive self-defence is part of PSI. Bolton, whose opinion is both representative and authoritative, has also argued that international law is not really law, in the sense that treaties may be morally or politically binding but they are not legally binding. The priorities and interests driving the counter-proliferation agenda have implications for international security priorities and activities, including the actions of the Security Council and the international law of peace and security. The focus on counter-proliferation efforts has a direct negative impact on universal disarmament objectives and on the non-proliferation regime as a whole. It also reflects a deeper set of interests and driving forces that do not seek nuclear disarmament as an urgent priority (whilst periodically and perfunctorily affirming it politically as a long-term or ultimate goal). The United States regards UN Security Council Resolution 1540 as a part of a “toolbox” of measures aimed at preventing WMD proliferation and in particular terrorist acquisition of WMD.Concern has been voiced by states and observers that, although Security Council action may be necessary for efficient global initiatives to prevent proliferation, an increased role as “global legislator” should be viewed with caution. Perceptions of power imbalance and mistrust are likely to be exacerbated by an increase in the legislative (albeit by requiring states to pass their own national legislation) and enforcement powers of the Security Council, whose permanent members are the official nuclear weapon states. Analyses of the challenges to the NPT and proposals to strengthen the regime often differ on the relative priority and the nature of the link between non-proliferation and disarmament. The link has been formally affirmed within the NPT review process, but the relative emphasis on counter-proliferation efforts stresses the non-proliferation aspects – and a selective approach to non-proliferation at that – over the disarmament aspects of the NPT agenda. U.S. counter-proliferation policy and the U.S. claim of a right of preventive self-defence also present challenges to the rule of law approach to international peace and security embodied in the UN Charter and customary international law. Although strengthening international law and its ability to help prevent the proliferation of WMD materials is a positive and desirable approach to international security, consistent with the principles and values of the UN Charter, counter-proliferation initiatives that seek to shape the development of international law raise concerns because they are informed by an approach that accommodates pre-emptive military action and policies that are widely viewed as discriminatory. To truly address counter proliferation means to limit opportunities for proliferation and to understand and address its causes. The States Party to the NPT have considered and addressed these causes and identified principles, objectives and practical steps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. These are reflected in the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences. Recent concrete proposals to strengthen the regime also deserve consideration. Only with an end to the promotion of nuclear technology (even to an elite few nations) and a serious programme of verifiable, transparent and irreversible steps to abolish the more than thirty thousand nuclear weapons in the world today, will the NPT survive and the world be able to step back from nuclear abyss. At its 2005 Review, NPT Member states must improve ‘the13 Steps towards disarmament’ if the Treaty is to meet its objectives and if the disarmament objectives of the NPT are to be honoured and fulfilled.The ‘13 steps’ should neither be weakened nor renegotiated but should be strengthened by the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). This is essential if the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and the rule of multilateral implementation of international treaties and law are to survive.Greenpeace is presenting to the 2005 NPT RevCon amendments a consolidated and amended 13 Steps that if adopted and implemented by all States Party to the NPT would take the NPT review process further forward to achieving its end goal of “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.