Proliferation Report: sensitive nuclear technology and plutonium technologies in the Republic of Korea and Japan, international collaboration and the need for a comprehensive fissile material treaty

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Executive summary: The issue of nuclear proliferation in North-east Asia is almost exclusively discussed in the international media in relation to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But the proliferation dynamic in this region is infinitely more complicated with the active presence of nuclear weapon states and advanced commercial nuclear industries. As the tension on the Korean peninsula continues to move through one of its more sensitive cycles, the threat of further nuclear weapons development by other countries in the region – specifically Japan and South Korea needs to receive greater attention. Faced with these challenges, the largest players in global nuclear trade led by the U.S., France, the UK and Russia, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) have initiated programs that will complicate further efforts to curtail proliferation. Their approach is to make the right sounding noises of concern, while going about the business of creating and expanding research programs in the most sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle. This paper provides detailed analysis of:1 - South Korea’s nuclear research institute (KAERI) pursuit of advanced plutonium reprocessing and fast breeder reactor knowledge and training, and the active support for this research provided by the U.S. Department of Energy nuclear laboratories, as well as under IAEA and NEA guidance the acquisition of expertise and knowledge from Japan, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Russia and others;2 - The status of Japan’s plutonium program including violation of its ‘no-plutonium stockpile surplus’ and projections of a 50-100 ton stockpile over the next ten-15 years, and the threat posed by the commissioning of the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant in 2006. As well as a look at Japan’s internationalization of its fast breeder reactor and reprocessing program, including with the U.S. and South Korea;3 - The nuclear proliferation implications of adopting the IAEA Expert group recommendations on Multilateral Fuel Cycle Approaches which will lead to more production and trade in nuclear weapons materials and due as a concept to be discussed during the May 2005 NPT Review Conference;4 - The alternative approach to IAEA/U.S. led non-proliferation efforts on the nuclear fuel cycle and the need for a comprehensive fissile material treaty, contributing to a range of efforts to reduce the proliferation and military threat in Northeast Asia.Greenpeace International has been opposed to the use of plutonium in commercial nuclear programs since the 1970’s. On one level the main players in this international trade in bomb material led by Europe and Japan have had to scale back their programs as the reality of the uneconomic and dangerous nature of their operations have come under greater public and political scrutiny. Without the public and political awareness of these programs their scale and therefore impact would undoubtedly have been far greater. However, in the last few years, the nuclear industry under IAEA, U.S., Japanese and French leadership, have started to revive advanced reactor concepts that were abandoned over 20 years ago due to many of these and other problems. Most of these concepts involve the large-scale use of plutonium and the operation of fast breeder reactors. The mistaken basis of much of this advocacy is that these technologies will be required due to the scarcity of uranium resources if nuclear energy is going to provide sufficient energy to combat major climate change.But the world is more sensitive to nuclear proliferation threats. Without being seen by policy makers and the wider public to be actively reducing the proliferation threat from nuclear energy, the IAEA and its closest and largest partners, believe that they cannot expand to the extent of their ambitions. That is the public face of the IAEA (nuclear watchdog in nukespeak parlance) and their allies: challenging nuclear proliferation threats. The reality is that they, together with some of the most powerful interests in the nuclear establishments of Japan, the U.S., France and Russia are planning the expansion of the most proliferation sensitive nuclear technology known to humankind. Twenty years after many of these plans were defeated, the public and policy makers need to be aware of the threat, mobilized, and again armed with the evidence and arguments that will stop programs which if realized will expand access to nuclear weapons material and divert valuable resources away from effective, and non-nuclear strategies to combat climate change.

Num. pages: 45