Why has Greenpeace commissioned this report?

What does the report examine?

The report addresses the following issues:

• the risks of an unplanned release of radioactivity from a CANDU-6 reactor;
• the CANDU-6’s ability to meet modern international nuclear safety standards;
• the risk that spent nuclear fuel will be diverted from a CANDU-6 for use in nuclear weapons;
• the adequacy of Canada's nuclear regulatory regime;
• the economic and safety risks associated with extending the life of a CANDU-6, such as Quebec’s Gentilly-2 station.

Who is the author of the report?

Dr. Gordon Thompson is an expert on the risks of nuclear plants. He is the executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies and a professor at Clark University. He has conducted numerous studies on the environmental and security impacts of nuclear facilities and on options for reducing those impacts. For example, Dr. Thompson prepared a report in 2000 for the Standing Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources of the Canadian Senate, discussing the accident risk posed by the Pickering ‘A' nuclear station.

Would a CANDU-6 design meet modern international nuclear safety standards?

No. In 2006 Ontario abandoned its plan to build a new CANDU-6 because of the design changes required to meet safety standards to prevent catastrophic accidents.

This raises questions regarding Canada’s ongoing support for the sale of CANDU-6 internationally. Any country willing to buy a CANDU-6 must also be willing to overlook rigorous safety reviews.

What significant design flaws would prevent the CANDU-6 from meeting international safety standards?

The CANDU-6 has a design flaw that contributed to the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor, which in turn led to the depopulation of a 30km area around the reactor.

Due to their “positive reactivity,” both the CANDU and Chernobyl reactors are prone to experience a rapid increase in reactor power when voids form in the coolant that is used to remove heat from the reactor core. This increase in reactor power makes it difficult to control the reactor, thereby increasing the chance of an explosion and the release of radioactivity.

Has the CANDU-6 been designed to withstand a terrorist attack?

No. The CANDU-6 is a pre-September 11th design and is not designed to resist a terrorist attack.

Dr. Thompson’s report shows that a CANDU-6 would not meet post September 11th safety requirements if they were rigorously applied.

Could the CANDU-6 design be used by a country to develop atomic weapons?

Yes. Canadian reactors have already been used by India to develop nuclear weapons.

The CANDU-6’s use of natural uranium makes it attractive to countries hoping to acquire plutonium to build atomic weapons.

The report says the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has weakened its nuclear safety standards. How so?

The report highlights how the CNSC has significantly weakened its modernized safety requirements to accommodate the design flaws of operating designs in Canada since they were first drafted in 2005

The weakening of safety standards has occurred since AECL lost a chance to build a CANDU-6 in Ontario due to the CNSC’s imposition of international safety standards. The Harper government subsequently fired CNSC president Linda Keen.

Why is the CNSC’s oversight of CANDU-6 life-extensions in Canada of concern?

The economics of rebuilding a CANDU nuclear station are weak and nuclear operators have a vested interest in avoiding the types of safety upgrades that would be required if the CNSC stringently imposed international safety standards.

The CNSC decides on what types of safety upgrades will be required based secret negotiations with nuclear operators.

Why is Hydro-Quebec’s decision to proceed with the life-extension of the Gentilly-2 nuclear station a concern?

Quebecers are being forced to live with an ageing reactor that was deemed to dangerous to build in Ontario.

Hydro-Quebec has admitted that the economics of rebuilding the Gentilly-2 nuclear station are weak and dependent on the regulatory requirements imposed by the CNSC.

There is thus a great deal of pressure on the CNSC to water down safety standards to accommodate the economic interests of Hydro-Quebec.