What does the report examine?
The report addresses the following issues:
- the risks of an unplanned release of radioactivity from a
CANDU-6 reactor;
- the CANDU-6's ability to meet modern international nuclear
safety standards;
- the risk that spent nuclear fuel will be diverted from a
CANDU-6 for use in nuclear weapons;
- the adequacy of Canada's nuclear regulatory regime;
- the economic and safety risks associated with extending the
life of a CANDU-6, such as Quebec's Gentilly-2 station.
Who is the author of the report?
Dr. Gordon Thompson is an expert on the risks of nuclear plants.
He is the executive Director of the Institute for Resource and
Security Studies and a professor at Clark University. He has
conducted numerous studies on the environmental and security
impacts of nuclear facilities and on options for reducing those
impacts. For example, Dr. Thompson prepared a report in 2000 for
the Standing Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources
of the Canadian Senate, discussing the accident risk posed by the
Pickering 'A' nuclear station.
Would a CANDU-6 design meet modern international nuclear safety
standards?
No. In 2006 Ontario abandoned its plan to build a new CANDU-6
because of the design changes required to meet safety standards to
prevent catastrophic accidents.
This raises questions regarding Canada's ongoing support for the
sale of CANDU-6 internationally. Any country willing to buy a
CANDU-6 must also be willing to overlook rigorous safety
reviews.
What significant design flaws would prevent the CANDU-6 from
meeting international safety standards?
The CANDU-6 has a design flaw that contributed to the explosion
of the Chernobyl reactor, which in turn led to the depopulation of
a 30km area around the reactor.
Due to their "positive reactivity," both the CANDU and Chernobyl
reactors are prone to experience a rapid increase in reactor power
when voids form in the coolant that is used to remove heat from the
reactor core. This increase in reactor power makes it difficult to
control the reactor, thereby increasing the chance of an explosion
and the release of radioactivity.
Has the CANDU-6 been designed to withstand a terrorist
attack?
No. The CANDU-6 is a pre-September 11th design and is not
designed to resist a terrorist attack.
Dr. Thompson's report shows that a CANDU-6 would not meet post
September 11th safety requirements if they were rigorously
applied.
Could the CANDU-6 design be used by a country to develop atomic
weapons?
Yes. Canadian reactors have already been used by India to
develop nuclear weapons.
The CANDU-6's use of natural uranium makes it attractive to
countries hoping to acquire plutonium to build atomic weapons.
The report says the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)
has weakened its nuclear safety standards. How so?
The report highlights how the CNSC has significantly weakened
its modernized safety requirements to accommodate the design flaws
of operating designs in Canada since they were first drafted in
2005
The weakening of safety standards has occurred since AECL lost a
chance to build a CANDU-6 in Ontario due to the CNSC's imposition
of international safety standards. The Harper government
subsequently fired CNSC president Linda Keen.
Why is the CNSC's oversight of CANDU-6 life-extensions in
Canada of concern?
The economics of rebuilding a CANDU nuclear station are weak and
nuclear operators have a vested interest in avoiding the types of
safety upgrades that would be required if the CNSC stringently
imposed international safety standards.
The CNSC decides on what types of safety upgrades will be
required based secret negotiations with nuclear operators.
Why is Hydro-Quebec's decision to proceed with the
life-extension of the Gentilly-2 nuclear station a concern?
Quebecers are being forced to live with an ageing reactor that
was deemed to dangerous to build in Ontario.
Hydro-Quebec has admitted that the economics of rebuilding the
Gentilly-2 nuclear station are weak and dependent on the regulatory
requirements imposed by the CNSC.
There is thus a great deal of pressure on the CNSC to water down
safety standards to accommodate the economic interests of
Hydro-Quebec.