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Overview

A nuclear war game is being fought out in the newspapers, at the G-7 summit, in the suburbs of Baghdad and the far reaches of Iraq, a kind of Cuban Missile Crisis in the Middle East, where the world is waiting to see if Saddam will blink first, and avoid renewed bombing. Nowhere yet has the lesson been gotten across that bombing a country out of the nuclear business might not actually be very effective. Allowing the UN Special Commission to carry out its mission, without the resumption of military action, is clearly the best way to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Once again, the Bush Administration seems to hold all the cards, the international community goes along, and the media guesses at what the US knows, sometimes mistaking what it knows for being all of what is known within US intelligence agencies.

The ongoing and recent revelations of Iraq's nuclear programs -- and its evasive and inadequate compliance with the UN ceasefire resolution -- can be explained partially as a result of the destruction caused in the war and the disarray that this has created in Iraq (rubble, no telephones, etc.). Add to this the secrecy that surrounded Iraq's program even in the Iraqi government (this may have contributed to some of the earlier statements by Iraqi diplomats that Iraq had no nuclear weapons materials or research and development facilities). This is not to excuse Iraq. There was evidently a large-scale clandestine nuclear weapons development program in the country. Iraq failed to live up to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The revelations call into question the specific assessments that were circulating in the public as to the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability before the war. While this does not mean that the predictions of Iraq being five to ten years (or more) away from having a nuclear weapon were wrong, it does point out that the technical evidence that was being employed to make the case was incomplete and largely irrelevant. Iraq has largely been able to develop nuclear weapons production capability relying mostly on indigenous resources, rather than clandestine trade in nuclear technology. Saddam has evidently been willing to go through the monumental expense (probably the biggest intangible impediment to the development of a nuclear weapon) of creating a program from scratch, realizing the many problems involved in trying to smuggle modern day nuclear weapons technology into the country.

US intelligence agencies and the UN estimate that Iraq has spent some \$4-8 billion to build its nuclear weapons infrastructure, all to produce the 1-3 kg of indigenous enriched uranium that the US intelligence agencies believe that Iraq had (or has). Over a multi-year period, ten times as much money would have been needed, in addition to inordinate national resources (such as approximately two percent of the entire nation's electrical production capacity), to manufacture a deliverable and reliable nuclear weapon. Probably the most significant assistance that was provided from the outside came in the form of education and training for Iraqi physicists and engineers. Nonetheless, it must be concluded that given enough time and enough money, Iraq would have produced a nuclear weapon; there seems little doubt that it was aggressively set on this path.

What exactly Iraq possesses at this point remains unclear. With the bombing of a dozen separate nuclear-related installations, and the destruction of Iraq's electrical power production capability, there is no chance that it could continue on its nuclear production path in the near future. What exactly the US bombed (other than Tuwaitha, which seems to have been thoroughly destroyed) is still not clear. One caution, however, is in order: just because the media has been reporting that this or that facility or piece of equipment (such as calutrons) were not destroyed, does not necessarily mean that they weren't.

In fact, one of the biggest problems in the entire crisis is trying to sort out the difference between what it is the media knows, what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN know, and what the US intelligence community knows. Media reporting on Iraqi nuclear capabilities prior to June was largely repetitive and speculative. But that should not be taken to mean that the US government didn't know many details of the state of Iraq's program, but just didn't feel compelled to share them with the media (and the public). As the UN Special Commission got underway to implement the ceasefire resolution to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, it is clear that the US intelligence community chose not to share what it knew or believed about Iraqi nuclear capabilities, preferring instead to reject Iraqi letters, and make available leaked information such as that coming from an Iraqi defector who showed up in Turkey in May. In the end, much of this crisis could have been averted if the US had just done a report on what it believed about Iraq's nuclear capabilities after the war, and identified the facilities and equipment that it believed existed openly. The control of information has certainly been one of the key features of fueling the fire.

What this crisis says about the enduring power of NUCLEAR weapons in the post-Cold War world is important. Normally anti-nuclear activists are criticized by the elite for being too apocalyptic, too 'worried' about nuclear accidents and demons, and for overreacting to the dangers of nuclear weapons. But here, it is the elite itself that is doing the overreacting. As a New York Times editorial on 11 July stated, 'Saddam Hussein has to know that the world is ready to resume bombing rather than see him get away with bomb-making.'

'The world,' however, is only ready because of the powerful nuclear weapons images that still persist in our society. The world is hardly exerting the same moral force, and certainly not producing the same results, when it comes to the bomb-making and NUCLEAR weapons of the five major powers. The Iraqi episode tells us that people, even the elite, clearly see that nuclear weapons are different, that they demand extraordinary action and control. It is as if this nuclear crisis has some momentum of its own, with more mystical social and cultural forces working to keep it on the front pages, just because it deals with nuclear weapons.

But as evil as Saddam Hussein has proven to be, it is difficult to understand why the connection between his nuclear weapons and 'our' nuclear weapons hasn't and won't be made. Next week, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev will meet to sign the START Treaty, an agreement that will set the process in motion to eliminate thousands of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. This treaty has been eight years in the making, and reflects the nuclear arms control consensus of the early 1980s rather than the 1990s. Unlike SALT, unlike the elimination of INF nuclear weapons from Europe, the public will not heave a sigh of relief as to this accomplishment. They may hardly even notice the Treaty. Maybe this is because of

the public's intuitive understanding that the menace of superpower nuclear war has disappeared. Maybe it is just a long overdue nuclear vacation, demonstrating that people will do anything not to think about these horrible objects.

Nevertheless, the new argument that will be made by the right wing (which generally loves the non-proliferation issue) is that it is not nuclear weapons that are bad, it is Iraq's nuclear weapons that are bad. With the new proliferation debate, and the cooperation of Iraq and North Korea, a line is being drawn between the need to eliminate 'bad' nuclear weapons and 'good' nuclear weapons. As proliferation continues to be the nuclear fad of the 1990s, it looks as if the agenda of completely eliminating other people's nuclear weapons will be divorced from any notion of nuclear disarmament for the nuclear powers. -30- (Greenbase Inventory July 30, 1991)

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HIGHLIGHTS

* Despite talk of Iraqi nuclear ambitions, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Middle East has not produced much public debate. Yet the U.S. will have some 1,000 nuclear warheads with its military forces in the region by mid-January, 300 land-based in Turkey, and 700 aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, surface ships, and attack submarines. Virtually all of these weapons are long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs.

* U.S. naval vessels in the Middle East by mid-January will include 22 nuclear-armed surface ships and nine nuclear-armed submarines.

* When U.S. naval forces are fully mobilized this month, 703 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles will be in the Middle East. This force is estimated to include 620 conventional, and 83 nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles.

* The estimated peak of 620 conventional Tomahawk missiles deployed in mid-January 1991 will constitute 60 percent of the U.S. Navy's total inventory of land-attack Tomahawk missiles with conventional

capabilities. The estimated 83 nuclear Tomahawk missiles will amount to 20 percent of the Navy's inventory of nuclear Tomahawks.

* The U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have some 620 nuclear-capable strike aircraft in the Middle East region.

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1 Introduction

U.S. nuclear weapons play a dangerous, yet little discussed, role in the Persian Gulf crisis. Preventing the development of an Iraqi nuclear capability has been used by the Bush Administration as one of its justifications for going to war, and talk of Iraqi nuclear ambitions has spurred new interest in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But much less has been said about U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, or the implications of the presence of tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons in the region on either a war or on nuclear proliferation. When reinforcing naval and ground forces are fully mobilized in late January and early February, the U.S. nuclear presence in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean Sea will reach approximately 1,000 warheads. This is some 30 percent of the Navy's arsenal of non-strategic weapons, and five percent of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. Naval nuclear weapons constitute the bulk of this force, accompanying the largest aircraft carrier force to be mobilized since the Second World War. The remainder of the weapons are air force bombs and army nuclear artillery projectiles land-based in Turkey, a member of the NATO alliance. The Bush Administration has remained silent on the subject of the role and use of U.S. nuclear weapons. While U.S. declaratory policy is that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which includes Iraq), Administration officials have declined to formally disavow the nuclear option in a potential war against Iraq. Nuclear weapons have reportedly been excluded from prospective war plans for an Iraqi conflict, but at the same time, U.S. leaders insist on maintaining nuclear secrecy and ambiguity regarding the possibility of nuclear use, a Cold War pattern that had been developed to maintain maximum flexibility in the deployment and operations of U.S. military forces. It is not our belief that U.S. military leaders intend to use nuclear weapons against Iraq, although their use remains a possibility, particularly given their presence and abundance. Instead, we are concerned with the implications of the routine deployment of U.S. weapons to the region. The Iraqi government has clearly taken notice of the deployment, and has made a number of statements about the nuclear threat. Thus the mere presence of U.S. nuclear weapons sends ambiguous and dangerous signals. Iraq could misinterpret or misunderstand the unclear and unstated U.S. policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons, resulting in otherwise un contemplated preemptive military action, or the Iraqi use of chemical weapons. The nuclear presence also undermines longer term U.S. objectives relating to regional security and nuclear

nonproliferation. The aura of usefulness and legitimacy accorded nuclear weapons by the presence in the region serves to undermine efforts to halt their spread, and could encourage Iraq and other governments to develop a nuclear counter to the U.S. presence in future regional conflicts. At a time when the Israeli government has expressed a new willingness to discuss the elimination of its nuclear capabilities, the U.S. desire to continue to deploy nuclear weapons to the region could become another sticking point to finding a new regional security solution. The reluctance of the Bush Administration and military leaders to forswear the use of tactical nuclear weapons, in itself, is based upon their belief that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons continue to have value beyond the Cold War, and beyond a nuclear-armed Soviet opponent. This holdover strategy, as well as the practice of routine naval nuclear deployments, creates the opening for development of a new post-Cold War nuclear dogma. U.S. regional military commands, which continue to maintain non-strategic nuclear war plans, could be encouraged to develop new nuclear strategies and policies for warfare outside of Europe and Korea, as well as the development of new nuclear weapons for Third

World and regional conflicts. Given the large scale presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region, there are a number of steps that the U.S. governments should take: The U.S. government should publicly and formally forswear the use of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf. Maintaining the option of resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, either in retaliation to a chemical attack, or in the face of a possible losing war, is both counterproductive and dangerous. Public ambiguity and secrecy about our nuclear plans and intentions is a holdover from the Cold War strategy for dealing with a heavily armed Soviet opponent, and should be changed. Nuclear weapons should be removed from ships and submarines in the region, and weapons forward deployed at small nuclear storage sites in Turkey should be evacuated. Naval nuclear weapons could be damaged, destroyed, or lost in the course of warfare, and are an added and unnecessary burden to forces operating in the region. Nuclear weapons in Turkey, some of which are only 200 miles from the Iraqi border and are guarded by only one or two dozen soldiers, could become the object of attack and or possible seizure by Iraqi forces.³ Nonproliferation efforts should be strengthened with a U.S. pledge to support the creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. New Israeli flexibility on the nuclear question, and renewed international resolve, may be one of the positive outcomes of the Iraqi crisis. At this point, however, in addition to working out the various differences between the

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Arab states and Israel relating to the elimination of the nuclear threat, a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone will likely have to include the nuclear forces of the declared nuclear powers. This would necessitate a shift in the U.S. position on the control of naval nuclear weapons, and an abandonment of the U.S. opposition to restrictions on naval operations implied by nuclear free zones. It is our belief that these policy changes would substantially enhance U.S. and regional security, with little risk to the U.S.

(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS William M. Arkin,
Joshua Handler, Damian Durrant
January 1991 (part two)

U.S. POLICY ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQ

Planning for the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the past two decades has almost exclusively concentrated on Soviet-U.S. conflict. But now new theories of the role of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear or near-nuclear foes could emerge as part of military planning to maintain a 'new world order.' The U.S. has some 8,000 nuclear weapons allocated for regional, non-strategic conflicts, almost 4,000 outside of Europe; 2,500 of those weapons are aboard naval forces, and can be easily transported to any part of the world. A growing majority of these weapons are long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, and air-delivered bombs.

The U.S. government believes that, even in the case of a war against an opponent such as the heavily armed and combat experienced Iraqi military, it has sufficient conventional might to prevail in a war. The use of nuclear weapons is thus dismissed, or not even considered by many military thinkers. Since Iraq is probably one of the worst cases of potential conflict that could be imagined in the post-Cold War period, it should thus be instructive how little U.S. nuclear weapons have been brought into play, and what little role or value they seem to have. This is perhaps the best reason to reevaluate their existence in the post-Cold War period. Despite what seems to be the lack of interest in the nuclear option against Iraq, U.S. government leaders have made a number of threats of the use of force, and particularly of retaliation to an Iraqi attack, that suggest the use of nuclear weapons. On 29 October, Secretary of State Baker stated in Los Angeles that Saddam Hussein must 'realize that should he

use chemical or biological weapons there will be the most severe consequences.'⁴ On 11 November, President Bush stated in an interview on Cable News Network that 'I am going to preserve all options, and if an option is out there it'd better be credible, and one way to have a credible option is to have enough force there to fulfill one's responsibilities if one has to exercise that option.' The latest statement was made by Secretary of Defense Cheney on 23 December, on a U.S. response to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons, that, '... He needs to be aware that the President will have

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available the full spectrum of capabilities. And were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. response would be absolutely overwhelming and it would be devastating....⁵ A number of prominent commentators, including two ex-Governors, have also called outright for the use of nuclear weapons in a war with Iraq.⁶ U.S. policy is ambiguous, and Iraq has made a number of statements which indicates that it recognizes the U.S. nuclear presence in the region, and expects that nuclear weapons could be brought into a conflict.

Nuclear weapons have been incorporated into the operations plans of the U.S. Central Command, responsible for the Middle East, since its inception in 1983. Nuclear planning followed President Jimmy Carter's warning in January 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that 'an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States' and 'will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.' This statement was taken to be a threat to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the face of a Soviet invasion of Iraq, but seemed to have little applicability to scenarios involving a non-nuclear opponent.

In fact, two years earlier, at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, President Carter decided to elaborate U.S. policy relating to halting the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as security guarantees to non-nuclear countries. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated on 12 June 1978, that the President declared:

'The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.'⁷ The U.S. policy on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states has been since reaffirmed by the Bush Administration, reflecting the renewed interest in nonproliferation.

According to Ronald F. Lehman II, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:⁸

'... US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Ambassador Ledogar, reaffirmed the US assurance in a March 13, 1990, plenary statement. At that time, Ambassador Ledogar added that 'we stand by this assurance as a firm and

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reliable statement of US policy.' It was also reiterated by Ambassador Kennedy at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meetings in February and June 1990. Most recently, the assurance was included in the principal US address to the fourth NPT Review Conference, which I delivered on August 21.' U.S. policy was also reiterated by Mr. Lehman at the United Nations in October 1990.

(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS William M. Arkin,
Joshua Handler, Damian Durrant January 1991 (part three)

NUCLEAR SHIPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Naval forces in the Middle East will consist of six aircraft carrier battle groups, and two battleship battle groups, together with numerous escorts and support vessels. This is twice as many U.S. carriers in one

operation than ever were in Vietnam at one time, and the largest deployment of American warships since the Second World War. Thirty-nine nuclear-capable vessels will be in the region as of mid-January. The nuclear naval force will consist of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, nine cruisers, five destroyers, nine attack submarines, and eight logistic support ships. These thirty-nine ships are estimated to be carrying 683 nuclear weapons, including 600 nuclear bombs and depth bombs aboard the six aircraft carriers, and 83 nuclear Tomahawk missiles aboard two battleships, nine cruisers, five destroyers and an estimated nine attack submarines.

Aircraft Carriers

As of the beginning of January, the USS Saratoga (CV-60) and USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) were rotating between stations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea,⁹ while the USS Midway (CV-41),¹⁰ was operating in the northern Arabian Sea, with occasional forays into the Persian Gulf itself.¹¹ The USS Ranger (CV-61) departed from San Diego, California, on 8 December, and is expected to join the USS Midway during the week of January 7. The USS America (CV-66) and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) departed from Norfolk, Virginia, on 28 December and are expected to be in the Middle East region by mid-January.¹² Of the six aircraft carriers, the USS Saratoga and USS Kennedy have been in the region the longest, each having departed their U.S. East Coast homeports on 7 August and 15 August respectively. The USS Midway, the next carrier to arrive, left its homeport of Yokosuka, Japan, in early October and was on station by 1 November.¹³ Each aircraft carrier has an estimated 100 nuclear strike

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bombs and anti-submarine depth bombs on board, approximately 90 of which are strike bombs for use against land targets. According to Navy sources, the 'loadout' of aircraft carriers is essentially the same for the Persian Gulf, as it is for other missions.¹⁴

Battleships

Two battleships are also in the region: the USS Missouri (BB-63) and USS Wisconsin (BB-64). The USS Wisconsin is reportedly operating in the Persian Gulf as part of the Joint Task Force Middle East, the other is operating outside the Persian Gulf.¹⁵ Of the two battleships, the USS Wisconsin has been in the area the longest. It departed from Norfolk, Virginia, at the same time as the USS Saratoga's aircraft carrier battle group in August. The USS Missouri departed Long Beach, California, on 13 November.¹⁶ The two battleships are each armed with eight four-cell armored box launchers (ABLS) for launching Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These carrier and battleship battle groups are escorted by 14 nuclear-capable cruisers and destroyers. Eight nuclear-capable support ships (four fast combat support ships and four ammunition ships) are also in the region. Twelve U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines, nine of which are thought to be nuclear-capable are also estimated to be in the region. Cruiser and destroyer escorts, as well as direct support attack submarines carry a combination of conventional and nuclear Tomahawk SLCMs. Support ships have the capacity to maintain, repair, and replenish nuclear weapons, components, and spare parts. The USS Ranger, USS America, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and USS Missouri battle group deployments to the region are the product of the 8 November White House announcement that three additional aircraft carrier battle groups, and a further battleship battle group would be dispatched to the Middle East. Increased Tomahawk Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Deployments The twenty-five surface ships and submarines in the region by mid-January are estimated to be armed with 703 Tomahawk missiles, including 83 nuclear versions. At the outset of the crisis, only two Tomahawk-armed surface

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ships were in the area as part of the Joint Task Force Middle East. These two ships carried some 71 Tomahawk missiles, 16 of which were estimated to be nuclear-armed. One Tomahawk-armed submarine with eight Tomahawk missiles, two of which are estimated to be nuclear, was also in the area. By mid-

January, with the arrival of the USS Ranger, USS America, and USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier battle groups, the number of Tomahawk-armed surface ships will climb to 16, while the estimated number of Tomahawk missiles on board will jump to 607, 62 of which are estimated to be nuclear-armed.¹⁷

It is estimated that two attack submarines accompany each aircraft carrier battle group in the Middle East. An important part of the mission of these submarines is land-attack strikes with their Tomahawk missiles. Nine of the twelve submarines estimated to be present are nuclear-armed. They contribute an additional 96 Tomahawk missiles, 21 of which are nuclear-armed.¹⁸

According to Navy sources and press reports, the numbers of conventional land-attack Tomahawk missiles aboard some late deploying vessels has been increased above the normal complement, and the number of nuclear weapons has declined slightly. The cruiser USS San Jacinto (CG-56) reportedly deployed armed solely (or predominantly) with Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, and without the normal complement of surface-to-air missiles (SAM). This is the first time any Navy ship has been so armed. The cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG-58) also is reported to be carrying twice as many Tomahawk missiles as the usual load.¹⁹ Navy sources also reported that the cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) which deployed with the USS Ranger carrier battle group, was also armed predominately with Tomahawks, similar to the San Jacinto.

Some 2,000 Tomahawk missiles of three basic types -- anti-ship, nuclear land-attack, and conventional land-attack -- are estimated to be in the U.S. arsenal as of January 1991. The total force of 703 nuclear and conventional Tomahawk missiles that is expected to be mobilized in the Middle East by mid-January is estimated to comprise 60 percent of the total conventional force of Tomahawk land-attack missiles in the U.S. military, and 20 percent of the nuclear land-attack Tomahawks in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.²⁰

Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide the ranges of Tomahawk missiles in relation to targets in both Iraq and Kuwait (using Baghdad and Kuwait City as center points). Figure 1 shows the maximum range of the 1,350 nautical mile nuclear Tomahawk (TLAM/N) missile, and its flexibility to hit targets throughout the region from virtually any point. Figure 2 depicts the more restricted range of the 600 nautical mile range conventional Tomahawk (TLAM/D and C) missile when launched from surface ships. As can be seen,

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launching ships would have a difficult time reaching targets from the Arabian Sea or the Red Sea or from the eastern portion of the Persian Gulf. Figure 3 shows even further targeting restrictions for the 430 nautical mile range submarine-launched conventional missile.

(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS
Arkin, Joshua Handler, Damian Durrant
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William M.
January 1991 (part

NUCLEAR PROPULSION REACTORS IN THE REGION

By mid-January, the U.S. will be operating an estimated 20 nuclear reactors on 16 vessels in the region. Twelve U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are estimated to be in the Middle East with the six carrier battle groups (words missing, transmission error) January.²¹ There are four nuclear-powered surface ships in the area: one aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, and three cruisers, the USS Mississippi, USS South Carolina,²² and USS Virginia, each with two reactors.

(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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Nuclear Ships in the Middle East, Mid-January 1991

Aircraft Carriers	23	Homeport	Weapons
USS Midway (CV-41)	24	Yokosuka, Japan	100 nuclear bombs/depth
bombs USS Saratoga (CV-60)	25	Mayport, FL	100 nuclear bombs/depth
bombs USS Ranger (CV-61)	26	San Diego, CA	100 nuclear bombs/depth
bombs USS America (CV-66)	27	Norfolk, VA	100 nuclear bombs/depth
bombs USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67)	28	Norfolk, VA	100 nuclear bombs/depth
bombs USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)	29	Norfolk, VA	100 nuclear bombs/depth

Battleships

USS Missouri (BB-63)	30	Long Beach, CA	32 Tomahawks, including
2 nuclear missiles USS Wisconsin (BB-64)	31	Norfolk, VA	32
Tomahawk, including	832		nuclear missiles

Cruisers

USS Virginia (CGN-38)	33	Norfolk, VA	8 Tomahawk (ABL),	missiles
including 2 nuclear				
USS Mississippi (CGN-40)	34	Norfolk, VA	8 Tomahawk (ABL),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS Bunker Hill (CG-52)	35	Yokosuka, Japan	12 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS Mobile Bay (CG-53)	36	Yokosuka, Japan	12 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55)	37	Mayport, FL	26 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS San Jacinto (CG-56)	38	Norfolk, VA	100 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 6 nuclear				
missiles USS Philippine Sea (CG-58)	39	Mayport, FL	26 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 6 nuclear				
missiles USS Princeton (CG-59)	40	Long Beach, CA	100 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS Normandy (CG-60)	41	Staten Island, NY	26 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles				10

Destroyers

USS Spruance (DD-963)	42	Mayport, FL	45 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 10 nuclear				
missiles USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964)	43	Long Beach, CA	45 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS Caron (DD-970)	44	Norfolk, VA	45 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles USS O'Brien (DD-975)	45	San Diego, CA	45 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 10 nuclear				
missiles USS Fife (DD-991)	46	Yokosuka, Japan	45 Tomahawk (VLS),	
including 2 nuclear				
missiles				

Support Ships

USS Sacramento (AOE-1)	47	Bremerton, WA	nuclear weapons service
USS Seattle (AOE-3)	48	Earle, NJ	nuclear weapons service
USS Detroit (AOE-4)	49	Earle, NJ	nuclear weapons service
USS Nitro (AE-23)	50	Earle, NJ	nuclear weapons service
USS Santa Barbara (AE-28)	51	Charleston, SC	nuclear weapons service
USS Mount Hood (AE-29)	52	Concord, CA	nuclear weapons service

USS Shasta (AE-33)	Concord, CA	nuclear weapons service
USS Kiska(AE-36)53	Concord, CA	nuclear weapons service
Attack Submarines		

9 unidentified submarines including 21 nuclear missiles54

96 Tomahawk,
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U.S.NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS	William M.
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U.S. Nuclear-Capable Strike Aircraft in the Middle East							
Aircraft	Service	Range	Nuclear	Number	Type		
km	Weapons						
F-15E	Air Force	1290	B61 bomb	24	F-16		
AirForce	925	B61,B57 bombs	188	F-111	Air Force	2400	
B61,B57,B43 bombs	48	F-117A	Air Force	-	B61 bomb		
40	A-6E	Navy	1700	B61,B57,B43 bombs	108	A-7E	Navy
800	B61,B57,B43 bombs	24	F/A-18	Navy	860	B61,B57	
bombs	104	A-6E	Marine Corps	1700	B61,B57,B43 bombs	40	
F/A-18	Marine Corps	860	B61,B57bombs	48	Total		
624	As of January 1991						

(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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U.S.NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS	William M.
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TOMAHAWK SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (SLCM)

The Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is an unmanned, self-propelled, low-flying, subsonic, guided missile that flies an evasive route over land terrain to its target. The Tomahawk is a U.S. Navy weapon of the same family of missiles, and similar, to the Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) now completing destruction under the INF Treaty. The Tomahawk SLCM is both conventionally and nuclear-armed for long range land-attack and anti-ship warfare. There are four variations of Tomahawk: conventional anti-ship missile (TASM), conventional high explosive land-attack missile (TLAM/C), conventional combined bomblets effects land-attack missile (TLAM/D), and nuclear land-attack missile (TLAM/N). The nuclear-armed land attack Tomahawk (TLAM/N) carries one W80 nuclear warhead with a selectable variable yield of 5-150 kilotons. Tomahawk missiles can be configured to be launched from either surface ships or attack submarines. Tomahawk can be launched from the torpedo tubes of Sturgeon class (SSN-637) and Los Angeles (SSN-688) submarines and the 12-missile capsule launching system (vertical tubes) on the latest Los Angeles class (SSN-688) submarines. The Navy also plans to deploy Tomahawk on its next generation of attack submarines, the Seawolf class (SSN-21) nuclear-powered attack submarine. Five types of surface ships (battleships, cruisers and destroyers) can fire Tomahawk SLCMs from either eight-celled armored box launchers (ABL) mounted on the deck or 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) mounted beneath the deck. The missile is 18 feet long and 21 inches in diameter, enabling it to fit into the standard torpedo tube. It weighs 3,200 pounds with booster. The Tomahawk SLCM has a top speed of Mach 0.7 (880 kmph/550 mph). The nuclear Tomahawk (TLAM/N) has a range of 1,350 nautical miles, the land attack surface ship-launched conventional warhead 600 nautical miles, land attack submarine-launched

conventional warhead 430 nautical miles, and the anti-ship configuration (TASM) of 250 nautical miles. Tomahawk is guided by a radar altimeter, and the inertial navigation and terrain contour matching system (TERCOM). TERCOM compares the terrain under the missile with an internal computer map onboard the missile to determine position and correct course. This system gives the missile an accuracy of striking a target to within 100 feet over maximum range. The anti-ship Tomahawk has a different guidance system using active radar to locate the target ship in the last portion of flight. A missile is propelled by a solid booster for launch and a small turbofan engine for cruise flight. All variants of Tomahawk remain in production. The nuclear

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Tomahawk missile is in full-scale production as is the W80 nuclear warhead. In the FY 1991 budget, a decision was made to reduce total conventional and nuclear Tomahawk procurement from 4,030 (including 30 test missiles) to 3,630 missiles. So far the Navy has procured 367 nuclear Tomahawk, and in FY 1991 funds were authorized for a further 75 nuclear Tomahawk (and 325 conventional weapons). A further 238 nuclear Tomahawk were to be bought in FY 1992, which was to be the last year of all conventional and nuclear Tomahawk production. However, the Navy has decided to stretch out buying all variants of Tomahawk until 1995 and the final mix of nuclear and conventional Tomahawk is under review. The assumption is that less than the originally planned 758 nuclear armed land attack versions will be procured, with a final figure nearer 440. As of January 1991, an estimated 367 nuclear Tomahawk TLAM/N have been deployed. The total Tomahawk force in the U.S. military as of November 1990 (the end of FY 1989 buy) numbers some 2,021 weapons. This is estimated to be broken down as 593 conventional anti-ship missiles (TASMs), 886 conventional high explosive land-attack missiles (TLAM/C), 175 conventional combined bomblets effects land-attack missiles (TLAM/D), and 367 nuclear land-attack missiles (TLAM/N). The total number of SLCMs purchased to date is 2,421, made up of 367 TLAM/N, 593 TASM, 1,194 TLAM-C, and 267 TLAM-D. A further 400 Tomahawks were authorized in FY 1991 with the mix of conventional and nuclear unknown for a new total of 2,821. Both General Dynamics-Convair located in San Diego, California and McDonnell Douglas of St. Louis, Missouri produce Tomahawks. The Tomahawk TLAM/N is deployed at U.S. Navy bases in the U.S. in the Pacific at: Concord, CA; North Island, CA; Alameda, CA; Pearl Harbor, HI; and Guam. In the Atlantic, it is supported at: Earle, NJ; Yorktown, VA; and Charleston, SC. Major overseas support facilities include the U.S. submarine tender based at La Maddalena, Sardinia, Italy. It is also carried aboard U.S. warships and attack submarines worldwide. The total cost of the Tomahawk SLCM program for the U.S. Navy will be \$10.3 billion.⁵⁵ This is comprised of \$9.8 billion for missiles from the DOD budget (of which \$2 billion is for the nuclear Tomahawk, TLAM/N), plus \$500 million for nuclear warheads for TLAM/N from the Department of Energy budget.

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	Tomahawk Ships (Present and Planned)		Submarines	Class
Armed (Jan 1991)	Planned (2000)	Sturgeon	(SSN-637)	18
23* Los Angeles	(SSN-688)	32	62 Sea Wolf	(SSN-
21)	0	5	Surface Ships	Iowa (BB-61)
3	0** Virginia	(CGN-38)	4	
4 Long Beach	(CGN-9)	1	1 Ticonderoga	(CG-47)
12	22 Spruance	(DDG-963)	16	31
Burke	(DDG-51)	0	29	Total

86 about 180 * The number of Sturgeon class SSNs which will be in the force in the year 2000 is unclear. ** The FY 1991 DOD budget contains plans to deactivate two battleships; the other two will be retired later.

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(Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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ENDNOTES

1. The only prominent discussions have been: John M. Broder, 'U.S. Forces Have No Nuclear Arms in Gulf States, No Plans to Use Them,' Los Angeles Times, 2 October 1990, p. A1; William M. Arkin, 'U.S. Nukes in the Gulf,' The Nation, 31 December 1990; Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, 'The Nuclear Question: Answer Likely to be no,' Washington Times, 2 January 1991, p. A1; R. Jeffrey Smith and Rick Atkinson, 'U.S. Rules Out Gulf Use of Nuclear, Chemical Arms,' Washington Post, 7 January 1991, p. A1.
2. On 14 December 1990, the Associated Press reported that Prime Minister Shamir of Israel proposed new regional talks including nuclear disarmament following his trip to the United States. He stated that Israel was ready to dismantle nonconventional weapons, and reiterated his proposal for 'a concrete proposal for a region free of nuclear weapons;' Gwen Ackerman, 'Israel-Shamir,' Associated Press (Jerusalem), 14 December 1990. Although Israel has made similar proposals in the past, there has been a noted softening of the Israeli position vis a vis its nuclear arsenal, including statements that could be interpreted as admitting that Israel has nuclear weapons.
3. The issue of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed to Saudi Arabia falling into Iraqi hands was raised in Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, 'The Nuclear Question: Answer Likely to be no,' Washington Times, 2 January 1991, p. A1.
4. Reuters, 'Baker Says U.S. Will Not Rule Out Force In Gulf,' 29 October 1990.
5. Press Conference, Secretary of Defense Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, 23 December 1990. See also the various statements recorded in William M. Arkin, 'U.S. Nukes in the Gulf,' The Nation, 31 December 1990.
6. Reed Irvine, 'Nuclear Threat Option,' Washington Times, 14 September 1990, p. F4; 'Washington Round-up: Talk of War,' Aviation Week & Space Technology, 5 November 1990, p. 19; 'Nuclear Attack on Iraq Urged by Ex-governor,' Washington Post, 1 January 1991, p. A20.
7. Department of State Bulletin, August 1978, p. 52.
8. Letter, Ronald F. Lehman II, to Jeremy J. Stone, Director Federation of American Scientists, 28 August 1990.
9. Michael Hedges, 'Coming to Grips,' Washington Times, 3 December 1990.
10. The USS Midway aircraft carrier battle group began operating in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region around 1 November. It replaced the USS Independence battle group which reached the end of its six month deployment in November (Independence began operations on 25 June). According to a Navy spokesman in San Diego the Independence had returned to San Diego by 20 December; conversation with U.S. Naval Air Forces Pacific (NAVAIRPAC) spokesman, San Diego, 31 December 1990.
11. James LeMoine, 'Midway's Pilots, Ready for War, Hope to Avoid It,' New York Times 28 November 1990.
12. U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990.
13. Two carriers have been in the region but have subsequently departed: the USS Dwight Eisenhower (CVN-69) and the USS Independence (CV-62). The USS Eisenhower was on station in the Eastern Mediterranean when Iraq invaded Kuwait. On 6 August it was sent from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. It left the Mediterranean on 3 September when it transited the Straits of Gibraltar on its return trip to the U.S. The USS Independence was on station in the Indian Ocean in early August and on 6 August began maneuvers in the North Arabian Sea. It departed the area around 1 November, after being relieved by the USS Midway; 'Desert Shield, September '90 Chronology,' All Hands, November 1990, p. 11; 'Gulf Crisis Chronology,' Wings of Gold, Winter 1990, pp. 29-32.

14. John Burlage and David S. Steigman, 'Supply Line: Navy Looking to add, expand shore facilities to cope with buildup,' Navy Times, 3 December 1990, p.4.

15. 'Persian Gulf Crisis Order of Battle' from U.S. Naval Institute Database, 31 December 1990.

16. 'Missouri leaves for gulf,' Navy News and Undersea Technology, 19 November 1990.

17. The destroyer USS David R. Ray (DD-971) and the cruiser USS Antietam (CG-54) which had been present since the outset of the crisis as part of the Joint Middle East Task force left the region in early October and early December respectively and according to a Navy spokesman return to their Long Beach, CA, on 26 October and 20 December 1990 respectively; conversation with Navy Surface Group public affairs office, Long Beach, CA, 31 December 1990 and 7 January 1991.

18. This is based upon the assumption of 1.5 nuclear-capable submarines per carrier battle group. Two attack submarines are estimated to accompany each carrier battle group. The overall front-line submarine force is made up of approximately half Los Angeles class and half Sturgeon class submarines. Some three-quarters of the Los Angeles class submarines are currently Tomahawk certified, while only about half of the Sturgeon class are so certified. Thus approximately three out of every four front-line submarines are Tomahawk certified. It is estimated that seven Los Angeles class submarines are operational with the vertical launching system (VLS), approximately one quarter of the entire class. Therefore, one quarter of the currently deployed Los Angeles class submarines are estimated to carry VLS. Los Angeles class submarines without VLS are estimated to carry eight Tomahawk, including two nuclear missiles earmarked for strategic reserve force missions. Early deployed Los Angeles class submarines with VLS are estimated to carry 20 Tomahawk, including five nuclear missiles earmarked for strategic reserve force missions. Los Angeles VLS submarines deploying with the latest carrier battle groups are thought to carry a reduced load of nuclear Tomahawks. Tomahawk-armed Sturgeon class submarines are estimated to carry eight Tomahawk, with two nuclear missiles.

19. 'San Jacinto becomes first cruise missile-only cruiser,' Navy News and Undersea Technology, 1 October 1990. To fulfill their mission of air-defense, Aegis cruisers normally carry significantly more surface-to-air missile (SAMs) than Tomahawks, reportedly 12 Tomahawks and 110 SAMs.

20. The total Tomahawk force in the U.S. military as of January 1991 is approximately the same number as was purchased through end of FY 1989 (Tomahawks are delivered some 12 to 18 months after their purchase) and consists of:

- 593 conventional anti-ship missiles (TASMs),	-
886 conventional high explosive land-attack missiles (TLAM/C),	-
175 conventional combined bomblets effects land-attack missiles (TLAM/D),	

and - 367 nuclear land-attack missiles (TLAM/N). It is assumed that very few anti-ship missiles have been loaded on U.S. vessels as Iraqi naval surface forces are negligible.

21. U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are each powered by one reactor.

22. The South Carolina is part of the USS Saratoga's battle group; Associated Press, 'Memorial Service Honors 21 Victims of Ferry Disaster,' Southern Illinoisan, 24 December 1990. 18

23. The only other carriers not in the Gulf, undergoing major overhauls, or recently returned from a six month deployment are the USS Nimitz and USS Abraham Lincoln. The USS Abraham Lincoln has been confirmed by the Navy to be in the process of transferring to its new homeport at Alameda, CA, and it is uncertain if it will be available for Operation Desert Shield. The USS Nimitz is currently based at Bremerton, WA, and is undergoing preparation for future deployments.

24. The Midway (CV-41) carrier battle group with escorts was first reported as departing from Yokosuka, Japan, in the last week of August for work up prior to deployment. It returned to Japan and then departed with a six ship task force from Yokosuka on 3 October and was subsequently reported en route to the Gulf region by the White House on 14 October 1990.

25. The Saratoga left its homeport of Mayport, FL, on 7 August 1990, and passed through the Suez canal toward the Persian Gulf around 20 August 1990. It was on station in the eastern Mediterranean Sea around 11 October 1990. Twenty-one sailors from the Saratoga were killed in a ferry accident on 22 December 1990 while the carrier was off Haifa, Israel, for liberty.

26. The Ranger departed San Diego, CA, on 8 December 1990 and was on station by the end of December.

27. The America departed Norfolk, VA, on 28 December for Operation Desert Shield; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. It is expected to be on station by mid- to late January 1991.

28. The Kennedy departed its homeport of Norfolk, VA, for Operation Desert Shield on 15 August 1990.

29. The Roosevelt departed Norfolk, VA, for Operation Desert Shield on 28 December; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. It is expected to be on station by mid- to late January 1991.

30. Departed for Long Beach, CA, for Operation Desert Shield on 13 November 1990. It is assumed the Missouri deployed with a minimal nuclear Tomahawk force to maximize conventional Tomahawk capability.

31. The Wisconsin deployed from its homeport of Norfolk, VA, at the same time as the Saratoga carrier battle group on 7 August 1990. It was in the region as of the last week of October; 'Battleship Poised for Gulf Action,' Air Force Times, 29 October 1990.

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32. Although the Washington Times has recently reported that the Wisconsin's nuclear Tomahawks were offloaded before it deployed, Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz 'Answer Likely to be No,' Washington Times, 2 January 1991.

33. The Virginia departed Norfolk, VA, for Operation Desert Shield on 28 December with the America carrier battlegroup; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. The Virginia is equipped with two four-celled Armored Box Launchers (ABLs) for firing Tomahawk cruise missiles.

34. The Mississippi departed Norfolk, VA, for Operation Desert Shield with the Kennedy carrier battle group on 15 August 1990. The Mississippi is equipped with two four-celled Armored Box Launchers (ABLs) for firing Tomahawk cruise missiles.

35. The Bunker Hill deployed with the Midway from its homeport of Yokosuka, Japan, on 3 October 1990. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

36. The Mobile Bay deployed with the Midway from its homeport of Yokosuka, Japan, at the beginning of October. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

37. The Leyte Gulf departed Mayport, FL, on 28 December as part of the Roosevelt carrier battle group; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

38. The San Jacinto left its homeport of Norfolk, VA, and deployed to the Persian Gulf with the Kennedy carrier battle group on 15 August 1990. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. News reports state it is completely armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles, having had its surface-to-air missiles removed; 'San Jacinto becomes first cruise missile-only cruiser,' Navy News & Undersea Technology, 22 October 1990. Navy sources suggest, however, it almost but not quite fully armed with Tomahawks.

39. The Philippine Sea passed through the Suez canal en-route to the Persian Gulf in the week prior to 27 August 1990, as part of the Saratoga carrier battle group. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

40. The Princeton deployed with the Ranger carrier battle group from Long Beach, CA, on 8 November 1990. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. Navy sources report, that like the San Jacinto, it is almost fully armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

41. The Normandy departed Staten Island, NY, on 28 December as part of the America carrier battle group; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. It is equipped with two 61-cell vertical launching systems (VLS) for firing Tomahawks and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

42. The Spruance is part of the Saratoga carrier battle group which deployed from Mayport, FL, on 7 August 1990. It is equipped with one 61-cell Vertical Launching System for firing Tomahawk and other missiles.

43. The Paul Foster deployed from Long Beach, CA, with the Ranger carrier battle group on 8 December 1990. It is equipped with one 61-cell Vertical Launching System for firing Tomahawk and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

44. The Caron departed Norfolk, VA, on 28 December as part of the Roosevelt carrier battle group; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990. It is equipped with one 61-cell Vertical Launching System for firing Tomahawk and other missiles. The ship is thought to carry less of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

45. According to U.S. Navy public affairs spokesperson in San Diego, CA, the O'Brien departed for the Gulf in August 1990 and is counted as present from 15 September 1990. It is equipped with one 61-cell Vertical Launching System for firing Tomahawk and other missiles. 21

46. The Fife Deployed with Midway from the homeport of Yokosuka, Japan, on 3 October 1990. It is equipped with one 61-cell Vertical Launch (a few words missing, transmission error) The ship is thought to of a load of nuclear Tomahawk missiles in order to maximize its conventional Tomahawk capability.

47. The Sacramento has been confirmed by a Navy spokesman to have departed with the battleship Missouri on 13 November.

48. The Seattle deployed as part of the Kennedy carrier battle group on 15 August 1990.

49. The Detroit deployed with the Saratoga carrier battle group around 7 August 1990.

50. The Nitro departed Earle, NJ, on 28 December as part of the Roosevelt carrier battle group; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990.

51. The Santa Barbara departed Charleston, SC, on 28 December as part of the America carrier battle group; U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 'USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS America Carrier Battlegroups,' News Release from United States Atlantic Fleet, 26 December 1990.

52. 'Bay chips in more warships,' Alameda Times-Star, 9 December 1990.

53. Commander Naval Forces Japan, 'Battle Group Alfa's Deployment with Multinational Force,' Press Statement, 12 October 1990, lists the Kiska as accompanying the USS Midway.

54. See endnote 18.

55. U.S. Navy Cruise Missile Project Office, Washington D.C., Communication, February 1990; DOD, Selected Acquisition Report, 30 September 1990.
=end= (Greenbase Inventory January 16, 1991)

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'File Name' gulfnuka.txt

Document number: 3337-Politics
Title: Greenpeace Statement on violence
Author: Greenpeace International
Organisation: Greenpeace International
Publication Date: October 2001
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Keywords: violence
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Greenpeace Statement

Terrorism and war are the ultimate, violent expressions of political conflict. Violent responses to violent attacks only breed further violence, further tragedy, and further human suffering. A Palestinian's loss of a son, an Israeli's loss of daughter, an American's loss of a father or an Afghani's loss of a mother are equal: human suffering is not lessened by the morality of the politics that caused it.

Our world has only recently taken its first steps away from the escalating global conflict of the Cold War, where new weapons systems bred newer weapons systems and attacks bred counter-attacks. We must not now allow a new conflict to beget an identical cycle of terror.

Our communities and their environments will remain sustainable and secure only if humanity can find peaceful means of resolving conflicts and ensuring justice.

Our world continues to bristle with nuclear weapons. Our world is threatened by new weapons systems and the prospect of a new arms race in space. Billion of people suffer daily from the lack of access to food, water, and to the basic means of survival. Environmental degradation has created millions of refugees, the world's massive dependence on fossil fuels has created political instability, and whole peoples are threatened by the sea-level rise associated with global warming.

Our world has yet to respond effectively to the prospects of widespread suffering and starvation presented by climate change, the poisoning of our planet, and the loss of biodiversity -- all of which raise fundamental questions about the security of our future. We can ill afford to further jeopardise that future by fuelling a massive new cycle of violence, potentially on a planetary scale.

Our plea to all parties in this emerging conflict is to view themselves as citizens of an imperilled planet, and to weigh their actions not against the short-term criteria of revenge and retaliation, but against the long term needs for our planet's peace and security.

All humanity, regardless of our political or economic differences, share the same most basic rights and needs and values. Our task now should be to create a global responses to the threats to our common future.

'File Name' Statement - latest

Document number: 3925-Nuclear

Title: A NEW GLOBAL SECURITY

Organisation: Greenpeace International

Publication Date: 2001

Publication Date (yyyy mm dd): 2001-11-07

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Full text: text: A NEW GLOBAL SECURITY

Gerd Leipold, Greenpeace International, Executive Director: Statement

It is time for the world to move beyond weapons to achieve a new global security.

Whether those weapons are aeroplanes full of people turned into murderous missiles or cluster bombs and cruise missiles falling on unarmed civilians, they will neither end conflict nor achieve the social and economic justice that is essential for real global security. All violence creates a dynamic, which increases the division of the world into opposing camps.

For thirty years now Greenpeace has borne witness to threats that endanger our environment and peace. We have taken non-violent direct action in order to protest crimes against the environment and crimes against peace. We have sailed our ships into the front line to stop nuclear tests in the Pacific, and to prevent boatloads of plutonium waste from depositing their lethal cargoes. We saved whales from being hunted to the point of extinction and ancient forests from wanton destruction. We have pointed out the terminal danger to our planet from the continued reckless burning of fossil fuels, and the poisoning of our air and our waterways from toxic chemicals.

For thirty years Greenpeace has spread the vision of a world that could be free from such dangers, a world that could be peaceful and secure.

Today, more than ever, that vision is needed to guide the world away from terror and war. We want to move towards the kind of security that comes from people everywhere in the world being free from hunger, poverty and disease, with clean water to drink, pure air to breathe, uncontaminated food to eat and free to live their lives without fear of terror or war.

For a more secure world, we need to discard dangerous technologies such as nuclear power and production of toxic materials. We must remove all biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Dependency on fossil fuel is driving climate change and perpetuating conflicts over resources.

In Doha, at the meeting of the WTO, we can work towards this goal by ensuring that trade is safe. We want to see sustainable development that embraces environmental and social concerns that is transparent, equitable and secures broad participation.

But it is not just in Doha we want to see these principles applied. Elsewhere in the world, we are working for a safe environment that can only come through true security.

We abhor the terrorist attacks in the United States, there can be no justification for them. The response to these attacks must be one based on the pursuit of justice through non-violent means.

We see no sense in the current conflict and we call for the war in Afghanistan to cease now.

We plead for a new kind of peace; one that is based on providing people with basic security in their lives where terrorism can take no hold; one that strives to build a world where interdependence represents mutual benefits rather than fearful apprehensions.

We seek a new way. A new security.

'File Name' Gerd's statement

Greenpeace calls for ceasefire in Kosovo.

ITAR/TASS News Agency

May. 07, 1999 11:30 E.T.

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newswire RECORD TYPE: Fulltext LANGUAGE: English

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TEXT:

MOSCOW, May 7 (Itar-Tass) -- The international environmentalist organisation Greenpeace has called for ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from Yugoslavia's embattled province of Kosovo. They believe the move will contribute to the political settlement and the return of all refugees to their homes.

Greenpeace activists regard an international peacekeeping force as a guarantee of ceasefire enforcement and due protection of peaceful civilians in Kosovo.

"The use of force is inadmissible in resolving political or ethnic conflicts either among countries or ethnic groups. Greenpeace has always been above politics. We condemn military actions in any part of the world, let it be Vietnam, Kuwait, Iraq or Yugoslavia. They inevitably result in death, great destruction and ecological disasters," said Sergei Tsyplenkov, Director of Greenpeace Russia.

Greenpeace-Friedensappell

Brief von Dr. Thilo Bode, Geschäftsführer von Greenpeace International, an **Nato-Generalsekretär Javier Solana Marariaga** und an den **[serbischen Präsidenten Slobodan Milosevic](#)**.

Mr. Javier Solana Marariaga
Autoroute de Zaventem
B- 1110 Brussels, Belgium

19th May, 1999

Mr. Secretary General,

Greenpeace has observed developments in Yugoslavia and Kosovo with growing concern. Greenpeace absolutely condemns the policy of "ethnic cleansing" being pursued by the government of Yugoslavia. We agree, of course, that this outrage against humanity must be halted. However, the NATO actions thus far have failed to put a stop to the killing and deportation of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. A growing number of people also believe that it may have exacerbated the problems, and that it certainly has not been successful in protecting these people or making it possible for them to return to their homes with any sense of security.

Greenpeace believes that the only route to a solution to this crisis lies in a cease-fire on all sides followed by the introduction of a truly international peace-enforcement presence in Kosovo, and the introduction of a conflict resolution and "peace-building" process.

In this context, I wish to draw your attention to the potential long-term problems that could result from the targeting of facilities which contain highly toxic or radioactive materials. Bombing such facilities is likely to result in wide-spread and long-term environmental contamination. The health and environmental consequences could long outlast the present conflict and would have, therefore, a significant negative impact on the possibility of building a successful peace and on the resettlement of refugees.

I would also like to echo the concerns of Italian fishermen and coastal municipalities with regard to the dumping of unused ammunitions in the Adriatic Sea. Such unused ammunitions dumped by NATO planes have reportedly been found in fishing nets.

NATO should provide the Italian Government with information about the nature and location of munitions, and most importantly, its plans to swiftly retrieve this material given the immediate and long-term dangers faced by other users of the sea, in particular fishermen. NATO should also inform the Secretariat of the London Convention at the International Maritime Organisation accordingly.

I urge you to address these considerations and concerns. In particular, without prejudice to Greenpeace's opposition to NATO's current strategy, as outlined above, I seek your assurance that NATO will refrain from targeting any facility that might release hazardous chemicals and radioactive materials which could cause significant and long-term health and environmental consequences.

Yours sincerely,

Thilo Bode
Executive Director
Greenpeace International

President Slobodan Milosevic
Bulevar Lenjina 2
11 070 Belgrade

19th May, 1999

Mr. President,

Greenpeace has observed developments in Yugoslavia and Kosovo with deep concern. Greenpeace absolutely condemns the policy of "ethnic cleansing" being pursued by the government of Yugoslavia. This outrage against humanity must be halted. The killing and forced deportation of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians is both morally and legally indefensible.

Greenpeace believes that the only route to a solution to the war lies in a cease-fire on all sides followed by the introduction of a truly international peace-enforcement presence in Kosovo, and the introduction of a conflict resolution and "peace-building" process.

We urge your Government to announce the immediate withdrawal of Yugoslavian troops and para-military forces from Kosovo and the acceptance of an international peace-enforcement presence there.

Yours sincerely,

Thilo Bode
Executive Director
Greenpeace International