Copenhagen Climate Summit
Greenpeace Demands

INTERNATIONAL

BRIEFING
MAY 2009

GREENPEACE
Introduction

As the reality of climate change continues to outstrip research findings, it is becoming clear that reaching the 'tipping point' is a far more immediate threat than we imagined and the window of opportunity for avoiding runaway climate change is rapidly and inexorably closing.

We now know that an increase in global temperature of even 1.5°C could lead to irreversible impacts and 2°C risks triggering catastrophic runaway climate change. We need a global plan that peaks global temperature rise as soon as humanly possible and enables us to return to well below current levels.

This year will see an intensive round of international negotiations, culminating in the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December as governments thrash out a deal to combat climate change. This represents the best chance we have of reversing current emissions trends in time to prevent the climate chaos that we are hurtling towards.

Grasping and shaping this opportunity requires leadership of a kind we have not yet seen on climate change. It demands that the world's heads of government take responsibility and work together to protect the people, the environment and the planet that, collectively, they represent and ensure that global greenhouse gas emissions peak by 2015, and start declining rapidly thereafter, reaching as close to zero as possible by mid-century.
Greenpeace demands

Greenpeace calls on governments gathering in Copenhagen for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Summit in December 2009, to agree the following:

1) **Legally binding emissions reduction obligations for industrialised countries**, as a group, of at least 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, at least three quarters of which need to be met by domestic action. Additionally, industrialised countries must also **pay for their emissions permits** in order to generate adequate and predictable funding, in the order of at least USD 140 billion annually, to support clean energy and other mitigation activities, forest protection and adaptation in developing countries.

2) **Mitigation actions for developing countries** in the spirit of a gradual widening, deepening and strengthening of the contributions from members of the UNFCCC, to achieve a **15-30% deviation from business as usual growth by 2020**. Of these emissions reductions, developing countries would unilaterally implement those negative and zero-cost ("no regret") measures that can be achieved without external assistance, with industrialised countries supporting the rest. The higher the level of economic development, emissions per capita and carbon intensity of economy, the greater the domestic effort of a country should be to reduce them and finance action.

3) A funding mechanism for **ending gross deforestation and associated emissions in all developing countries by 2020**, and achieving zero deforestation by 2015 in priority areas, such as the Amazon, the Congo Basin, and the Paradise forests of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. These emission reductions must be in addition to the cuts in emissions as described in paragraph 1. Priority protection should be given to areas with high conservation value and those areas which are important for the livelihoods of indigenous peoples and forest communities.

While the challenges we face this year are huge, **there has never been better momentum for a groundbreaking deal**. Climate chaos can and must be prevented but it requires nothing less than an ambitious and urgent emergency plan for the planet and our future. The Copenhagen Summit must agree to **legally binding, timely and deep emissions reductions that are ambitious, equitable and fair**. These must be supported by funding mechanisms and policies that enable a sustainable energy future, protect our magnificent natural forests and create a renewable energy revolution, while meeting the needs of the poor.

Widespread and urgent discussions on how to rescue the global economy provide world leaders with a perfect opportunity to develop stimulus packages that cut greenhouse gas emissions and create green jobs. By contrast, locking us into a future of expensive and dirty energy will result in a climate crisis that will make today’s economic troubles look trivial by comparison.
The deal Copenhagen must deliver for the climate

Greenpeace calls for a deal by the end of 2009 based on the following principles:

• it must be global
• it must be fair and equitable
• it must gradually widen and deepen action; and
• it must offer sustainable solutions

The success of the Copenhagen deal will be measured by whether it puts us on a global emissions pathway that will enable temperature rise to peak and decline as fast as humanly possible. This will require the growth of global emissions to be halted by 2015 and revised to a steadily declining trend well before 2020.

In more practical terms, it must include:

1) Ambitious emissions reductions for developed countries

There will be no ambitious deal without unprecedented leadership by developed countries. They must take responsibility for the problem they have already created and continue to contribute to disproportionately in comparison to the developing countries. They must live up to the leadership promises they made in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and in Kyoto in 1997. This is the only way to build the necessary mutual trust between developed and developing countries.

Developed countries, as a group, must commit to binding emissions caps in the order of 23% by 2015 (during the second commitment period) leading to 40% cuts by 2020 (during the third commitment period) - of which at least three quarters should be met with domestic action. These overall targets must be differentiated within the group according to the criteria of responsibility over historical and present emissions, capability to act and potential to mitigate.

2) Action for developing countries in the spirit of gradual widening and deepening of global action

Today the developing country group (non-Annex I) is highly diverse. On the one hand, it contains countries that are richer than some of the current industrialised (Annex I) countries, and nations whose per capita emissions are equal to or way above those of certain industrialised countries. On the other hand, this group also includes large numbers of very poor countries who have scarcely contributed at all to current global warming yet are suffering - and will continue to suffer the most - from the impacts of climate change. There are also countries with relatively low per capita emissions in the energy sector but huge emissions from deforestation.

It is clear that all developing countries cannot be treated the same. Criteria need to be developed to determine the actions of developing countries.

In order to be equitable and to reflect national circumstances, the level of action should be based on a country’s responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Concrete indicators used to quantitatively capture each country’s national situation are as follows:

• Responsibility: historical emissions since 1990
• Capability: GDP per capita/human development index
• Potential: emissions intensity, emissions per capita and emissions growth rate.

The above criteria should be applied as a basis for assigning mitigation action and defining the level of financial support for implementation.

While in the (likely) second commitment period (2013-2017), only a few developing countries should be expected to take on binding economy-wide emissions caps, it is clear that by the third commitment period (2018-2022) many of the rapidly industrialising countries will reach a higher level of economic development and will have a greater capacity to act, which means they will need to take on binding, absolute emissions reduction or limitation obligations. The Copenhagen outcome needs to build in this principle of graduation.

---

1 While emissions in some developing countries have been growing rapidly in recent years, per capita emissions of industrialised countries are still much higher than those of developing countries, definitely if one takes into account the historical emissions of greenhouse gases which continue to be active in the atmosphere.

2 Some examples: 2005 per capita emissions of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are five to ten times those of Romania, Croatia or Latvia, China’s per capita emissions are three times those of India; and per capita emissions of all 49 Least Developed Countries combined are less than those of Belgium alone. Based on CAIT figures: http://cait.wri.org
3) Massively increased and re-directed public and private funding for mitigation and adaptation

Developed countries need to commit to massively scaled-up, adequate and predictable funding to enable developing countries to accelerate their uptake of clean technology, rapidly reduce tropical forest destruction and undertake wide-scale pre-emptive adaptation programmes. While redirecting and up-scaling private funding will be of utmost importance, especially in financing low-carbon development and technology, public funding streams will need to be increased by two or three orders of magnitude on top of existing and promised development aid. According to initial estimates, the developed countries need to provide at least USD 140 billion a year in annual public funding. Of this, more than one third is needed for adaptation to unavoidable impacts of climate change, and approximately one third to reduce deforestation.

It is clear that such large sums would never be pledged and channelled annually through national budgets. Instead, we need mechanisms that generate predictable funding automatically, independent of national treasuries. The main fund-generating mechanism should be either the international auctioning of developed countries’ Assigned emissions Amount Units (AAUs); putting a levy on these emissions permits - or a combination of both, so that industrialised countries would have to pay for (a portion of) their emissions allowances in the future.

The auction revenues would be directed to a fund that would have different funding windows for:

a) Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in developing countries. This will provide the necessary scale and financing to move towards zero deforestation by 2020. The money will fund avoided deforestation policies and activities in developing countries. The main principles for disbursing the money would be national accounting, monitoring and verification - not project funding. This will ensure that forests are not treated just as carbon stocks but are also recognised for their rich biodiversity values and the rights of indigenous peoples and forest communities are respected.

b) Adaptation. This window will fund and support enhanced action in the areas of risk management and risk sharing, disaster reduction strategies and international cooperation to support the urgent implementation of adaptation actions.

c) Clean energy and technology. This window would aim at kick-starting an energy revolution by funding research and development cooperation at the international level, accelerated clean technology uptake in developing countries and non-credited mitigation policies and measures in developing countries. It could, for example, fund feed-in tariffs in developing countries, which would create the necessary conditions for a rapid uptake of renewable energies.

Developing countries, for their part, need to ensure that the money is well spent and delivers real benefits for the planet and their people in the form of emissions reductions, reduced deforestation rates and adaptation. This requires setting up robust measuring, reporting and verification methods and practises in developing countries, which will require capacity building.
The deal Copenhagen must deliver for the climate - continued

4) An effective carbon market to reduce energy-related emissions while ensuring REDD is excluded from the carbon market

Of the three existing carbon market mechanisms under the UNFCCC, only the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has generated a significant amount of money\(^3\). While the CDM has succeeded in channelling significantly more funding to developing countries than any of the climate funds under the UNFCCC, it has disbursed the money to only a few countries and the projects have delivered very little emissions reductions or sustainable development. In fact, the mechanism has allowed a net increase in emissions, compared to a situation where the CDM didn’t exist\(^4\). It is clear that this cannot continue post-2012.

However, failures of existing market mechanisms do not mean that market mechanisms as such could not work. They need to be carefully designed. New carbon market mechanisms have the potential to deliver additional emissions reductions whilst lowering costs (providing the target level is ambitious enough) but they need to go beyond simply offsetting industrialised country emissions. They must instead incentivise developing countries’ own action and sustainable development, such as sectoral and national no-lose targets. From 2013 onwards, the CDM as a project-based mechanism should be limited to least developed countries and other developing countries with little capacity to act. For other, more able developing countries, the post 2012 deal needs to provide new mechanisms, such as no-lose targets, which incentivise long-term low-carbon development planning on a sectoral and economy-wide level, deliver additional emissions reductions and reduce transaction costs. Activities in the covered sectors should also be supported by capacity building, technological cooperation and up-front financing by industrialised countries, where appropriate.

Carbon market mechanisms are designed to effectively reduce energy-related emissions, while the nature of emissions from the destruction of forests and their reductions requires strong public control. Forests are not only carbon sinks, but are also global centres of biodiversity which provide homes and livelihoods for millions of people. Furthermore, there are many technical problems associated with the monitoring, calculating and accounting of emissions from deforestation. Public control over forest protection measures and funding is necessary to ensure that emissions reductions go hand in hand with protecting biodiversity and forest dependent peoples’ rights.

Greenpeace urges governments to reject the use of market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries.

5) Exclusion of unsustainable technologies from support schemes and carbon markets under points 4 and 5

Technology, financing or capacity building provided in relation to nuclear, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other unsustainable technologies should not count as ‘measured, reported and verified’ support by developed countries under the post-2012 agreement. Furthermore dirty credits (achieved with unsustainable technologies) should be excluded from all international carbon markets.

6) Capping of international aviation and marine fuels

International aviation and maritime emissions must be properly tackled in the post-2012 agreement. Both sectors are fast-growing and significant sources of emissions. Industrialised countries must include aviation emissions in their overall emissions reduction targets and account for them at the point of sale of the fuel. Several unique features of maritime transport mean that a sector-specific approach is likely to be the most appropriate way to address emissions from shipping.

\(^3\) Clean Development Mechanism, CDM, enables industrialised countries to avoid emission reductions at home by financing emission reduction projects in developing countries. Other existing market mechanisms under the UNFCCC are Joint Implementation (JI), where an Annex I country can acquire credits by implementing/funding emission reductions in other Annex I countries (economies in transition) and International Emission Trading (IET), through which Annex I countries likely to exceed their quotas could buy AAUs from countries who are overachieving their quotas (practically countries in transition). JI and IET have not, and are not likely to play a big role in the first commitment period, and are likely to have an even smaller role in the second commitment period.

The deal Copenhagen must deliver for the climate - continued

7) New institutional arrangements to facilitate adaptation, mitigation, technology and forest protection activities

The Copenhagen agreement will create a need for monitoring and managing big sums of existing and additional public funding, mainly from developed countries, and this money needs to be well spent. It has to deliver the benefits it aims to deliver, in a timely, efficient, equitable and incentivising manner. There will also be a huge need for technical assistance and facilitation related to monitoring, reporting and verifying of developing country emissions, forest management and adaptation activities, as well as the international technological cooperation. It is clear that the UNFCCC’s current institutional framework cannot facilitate this.

The UN Framework needs to bring in more expertise, more permanent facilitation, more regionalisation and flexibility. All financing generated through the Copenhagen deal should be monitored within the UN structure and must be accompanied by a strong compliance regime and severe penalties for non-compliance. The governance of these mechanisms must be democratic, inclusive, accountable and transparent, and should allow participation and input from those directly involved. Procedures and safeguards must be put in place to ensure that civil society is engaged in governance of climate finance, including the national level planning and monitoring of the funding dispersal within each country. This will help ensure full transparency of funding use within the country, that the public’s money is effectively utilised, and the greatest possible contribution is made to sustainable development at the local level.

New expert panels and a subsidiary body/subsidiary bodies need to be established to support the work of the COP and the fund.

8) Phase-out of F-gases in close cooperation with the Montreal Protocol

There will be an accelerated phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) under the Montreal Protocol over the coming decade. If these are primarily replaced with hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) there will be a rapid increase in greenhouse gas emissions as most HFCs are potent greenhouse gases.

As part of the Copenhagen agreement, an international HFC phase-out arrangement should be agreed. This will guide industry in both industrialised and developing countries towards the uptake of presently readily available HFC-free technologies. It will further guide industry towards intensified research and development of additional HFC-free alternatives.

Within the context of the Montreal Protocol, possibilities are currently being assessed and explored of how to reduce emissions of F-gases stored in products and equipment (so-called “banks”). These assessments will be made in close co-operation with the UNFCCC/KP process and should lead to the creation of financial instruments for the purpose of establishing a global network for the recapture and safe destruction of these substances.
Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organisation that acts to change attitudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace.

Published by
Greenpeace International
Otto Heldringstraat 5
1066 AZ Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 7182000

For more information contact:
enquiries@greenpeace.org

greenpeace.org

Cover Image
Wind turbines at the Nan wind farm in Nan’ao, Guangdong Province has one of the best wind resources in China and is already home to several industrial scale wind farms. Massive investment in wind power will help China overcome its reliance on climate destroying fossil fuel power and solve its energy supply problem.