The nuclear industry is dependent upon the transportation of nuclear components and materials (uranium, fresh fuel, nuclear spent fuel and plutonium). Radioactive materials are carried by sea, rail, road and air. So even if you do not live near a nuclear power station, you may be near a transport route without even knowing about it.
A Greenpeace inflatable escorts the Nuclear Free Tasman flotilla out to sea where they will meet up with other Greenpeace boats to protest over plutonium being shipped through the Pacific Ocean.
Nuclear transports involve significant risks to human health and
the environment. One cask full of highly radioactive spent fuel
elements contains approximately as much radiation as was released
by the Chernobyl accident. As well as being vulnerable to
accidents, transports could be targets for terrorist attacks or the
theft of fissile materials.
The transportation regulations in most countries are based on
various versions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
"Regulations on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials." These
regulations were drafted with the aim of guaranteeing the ability
of the nuclear industry to operate, not to guarantee nuclear
safety. The waste is transported in casks that the nuclear industry
claims are safe because they have to undergo some crash tests.
But in reality the standards for the transportation of spent
fuel do not reflect real accident conditions. Spent fuel casks and
other type B containers are required to survive drops of only 9
metres. Even less burdensome are the fire standards whereby
containers are required to resist temperatures of 800° C for up to
30 minutes. Studies, including those commissioned by Greenpeace,
have shown that in real accidents, for example at sea or in
tunnels, fires often burn at temperatures exceeding 800° C and for
considerably longer than 30 minutes. Average ship fires for example
burn for 23 hours, and at over 1000 degrees.
Reassurances from industry and governments that the containers
are "safe" have been challenged by governments, independent experts
and citizens. For example, sea shipments of nuclear waste and
plutonium between Europe and Japan have been vociferously opposed
by tens of governments in the Caribbean, Central and South America,
Africa and the South Pacific.
Public at Risk
Transports in western Europe, in particular in France and
Germany have been opposed by communities and thousands of ordinary
people. This opposition has been bolstered by revelations of
contamination, accidents, and cover-ups. For more than two years
(1998-2000) all movement of spent fuel from Germany to France was
suspended following disclosures of external contamination of
containers above the permitted level.
While the nuclear industry had ambitions to move large amounts
of nuclear material by air, they have been thwarted in most of
their plans due to the evidence of weak standards and the real
concerns of both professional institutions (such as international
pilot's federation), politicians and the general public. The same
drop test standard of 9 metres when applied to aircraft carrying
nuclear containers, highlights the fundamentally flawed approach of
the nuclear industry.
Highly sensitive nuclear transports, including those carrying
large amounts of plutonium, are extremely vulnerable to deliberate
attack. The fundamental problem is that materials that are directly
usable in nuclear weapons, are treated like any other
commodity.
In addition to the profound safety issues, nuclear transports
are conducted without prior notification, let alone the consent, of
the communities or countries along the transport routes. All of
these factors have led to the continued growth of opposition to
nuclear transports by many communities, environmentalists and
politicians around the world.