

**2005 Review Conference to the
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT RevCon)**

May 2 –27, 2005

“[There has been a] persistent and serious situation of erosion of confidence in the mechanisms of the NPT and on the ability of the instrument to survive the tests it has been put through. This situation is not new, but it seems to have grown more complex since the indefinite extension in 1995.”

(Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, 2005 (Brazil)
President-designate of the 2005 NPT RevCon)

Background

This year's Review Conference will start in a position of crisis. The crucial “13 Steps for Nuclear Disarmament” agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference has all but been ignored by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and in particular the US Government has withdrawn its support for a large number of them. The lack of verification and transparency in past arms control agreements, the push for new nuclear weapons and the establishment of new nuclear doctrines by some of the NWS have also undermined confidence in the international nuclear-non-proliferation and disarmament regime. North Korea has become the first state to withdraw from the NPT. The US and China along with a few others have so far failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thus rendering it almost ineffective.

Iran's continued development of its nuclear programme and revelations about Libyan, Egyptian and South Korean secret nuclear programmes have also cast doubt on the thirty-five year old treaty's future.

Continual increasing production and stockpiling of plutonium, an increased ability to use nuclear materials, and the incentive and desire by some States to acquire nuclear weapons are all straining the seams of the NPT and creating a crisis in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The 2004 Preparatory Committee Meeting failed to agree to a report containing recommendations for this year's Review Conference, and could not agree on an agenda. Instead, the NWS, led by the United States, focused on claimed violations of the NPT by Iran and North Korea, Further, a number of Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) focused on claims of non-compliance by the NWS in their failure to make any progress on nuclear disarmament.

Led by the US delegation, the refusal by some to have any reference made to landmark decisions taken at the two previous review conferences in the consensus report has led to an unacceptable stalemate within the NPT itself.

Likewise, the NWS have ignored the calls by Dr ElBaradei, Director-General of the IAEA, and the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that the erosion of the non-proliferation regime threatens a cascade of proliferation. Instead of engaging in negotiations for fissile material controls and implementing a moratorium on reprocessing, the NWS have encouraged reprocessing, obstructed negotiations and have focused instead of attempting to control where nuclear materials are delivered through the Proliferation Security Initiative, rather than controlling nuclear materials themselves.

Outside of the NPT we are also all too aware of the failures within the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission and the reasons for them. The Way Ahead

"The only reasonable conclusion is that the control of technology is not, in itself, a sufficient barrier against further proliferation. For an increasing number of countries with a highly developed industrial infrastructure — and in some cases access to high enriched uranium or plutonium — the international community must rely primarily on a continuing perception of security as the basis for the adherence of these countries to their non-proliferation commitments."

(Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, 4 November 2004, Stanford University, California, USA)

Nuclear proliferation can only be dealt with if all nations are treated equally and there is an end to the provision in the NPT that all nations have the right of access to nuclear technology. The acquisition of nuclear technology (legally or on the black market) can lead to the nuclear bomb, as India, Pakistan, Israel operating outside of the NPT and North Korea operating within have displayed.

Only with an end to the promotion of nuclear technology (even to an elite few nations) and a serious programme of verifiable, transparent and irreversible steps to abolish the more than thirty thousand nuclear weapons in the world today, will the NPT survive and the world be able to step back from nuclear abyss.

Recommendations

Greenpeace is calling for the implementation of four major recommendations which it believes are essential to achieve the purposes of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament under the NPT:

"Like many of you, I am convinced that efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation must go hand in hand with progress in nuclear disarmament."
(UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 23 February 2005)

1. The States Party to the NPT should reaffirm their unequivocal support for the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences and further strengthen them at the 2005 NPT RevCon.

The 'thirteen steps for nuclear disarmament' agreed to unanimously at the 2000 NPT RevCon were a landmark achievement for States Party to the NPT It provided a roadmap towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Yet at its 2003 meeting the US delegation shattered the consensus by making it quite clear that it no longer supported the majority of the 13 steps. The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has recognised that the 13 steps "were all but renounced" by the NWS, acknowledged the damage that has been caused by such a move and called for the NWS to take steps to restart disarmament.

If the crisis of confidence in the NPT and its supporting regime is to be reversed, then the decisions taken at the 2000 and 2005 Review Conferences must be reaffirmed and strengthened. Greenpeace has made some amendments to the 13 steps which it believes are necessary to strengthen and improve upon them.

"...the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk... We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."

(Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 111, December 2004)

2. The States Party to the NPT should agree to an immediate moratorium on and a timetable for the complete phase out of uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing for civil and military purposes.

In addition to large amounts of military plutonium due to enter the commercial fuel cycle over the coming decades, the amount of separated weapons-usable plutonium in civilian stocks (over 230 tons in 230) is now rivals or exceeds the amount of plutonium held in military programs.¹ Civilian reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication and use presents a growing proliferation risk that must be addressed. As it would take as little as five kilograms of this commercial plutonium being held by countries involved in nuclear

¹ See Declarations of the Permanent Missions to the IAEA, published under the reference n°549 of the IAEA "Information Circular" at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/>, and Institute for Science and International Security, "Global Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Stocks, by Origin, end 2003," at http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/summary_tables.html#table1

reprocessing for a state or terrorist organisation to build a nuclear bomb, the threat posed by the mere existence of plutonium must be addressed by the global community.

While these plutonium programs are a threat to global peace and security, they are driven by a relatively small number of advanced industrialised states, specifically, France, the UK, Japan and Russia, along with client countries in Europe. Given the scale of the threat posed by fissile materials, it is even more appropriate therefore that these nations and their industrial/commercial entities should be challenged over their misguided nuclear policies.

Greenpeace believes one of the most effective ways to address nuclear proliferation is to stop the further reprocessing of plutonium, and to treat existing stocks as nuclear waste.

"Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is essential if we are to have a more secure world. This means doing better at reducing demand for these weapons and curbing the supply of weapons materials. It means living up to existing treaty commitments, including for negotiations towards nuclear disarmament."

(Executive Summary of the Report of
the UN High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, December 2004)

3. The NPT States Parties should agree to start negotiations immediately on a comprehensive and verifiable fissile material treaty at the Conference on Disarmament with the aim of ending all production, stockpiling and use, and reject the recommendations of the IAEA Expert Working Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and proposals by the US Department of Energy.

As noted by the seven foreign Ministers of the "New Agenda Coalition", in banning the production of key components of nuclear weapons, enriched uranium and plutonium, the Treaty would "form a cornerstone in the nuclear disarmament process. It would impose restraints on India, Israel and Pakistan, the three states still outside the NPT. Together with the test-ban treaty, it would go a long way to uphold the NPT and strengthen the norm on nuclear non- proliferation and nuclear disarmament."

“For the five countries recognized as nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, their nuclear arsenals are increasingly becoming either a focal point for resentment or cynicism among the nuclear “have-nots”, or, worse, a target for emulation for States that wish to pursue clandestine WMD programmes.”

(Mohammed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, 4 November 2004, Stanford University, California, USA)

4. The States Party to the NPT should decide on a moratorium on all shipments of plutonium until the discriminatory nature of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) can be remedied

The PSI is flawed in that it does not address either the ships or the cargoes of material themselves, or, in practice, the proliferating state sending the materials.

The PSI risks being approached as a substitute for a non-proliferation policy, and as replacing or undermining, rather than supplementing, existing nuclear non-proliferation strategies and policies.

It is also inconsistent with Security Council resolution 1540 in its restrictive ambit and discriminatory approach.

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