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The estimated cost of UF6 utilization (complete defluorization + burial of received uranium oxide) is, according to the data of the URENCO Company 6.02 USD/ kg of UF6, including defluorization which is 1.26 USD/ kg of UF6. With account for possible sale of fluoric acid (by-product of defluorization) on the world market, the cost decreases from 5.46 and 0.7 USD/ kg of UF6, respectively.
As for conversion and burial of UF6 of West-European origin, the cost of utilization of 125 thou. tons of this material will be 0.09 mln and 0.68 mln, respectively. Performing a calculation into revenue of enrichment plants received before additional enrichment of this material (estimated as $ 3.14 bln), it appears that it was necessary to spend 22% of the revenue for the whole UF6 utilization (defluorization + burial), and 3% - for defluorization. But, most likely, these funds were used for other expenses. It should be mentioned that a considerable part of funds received from sale of enrichment service when processing West-European UF6 (35-60%) was transferred into the federal budget or to the accounts of OAO Techsnabexport, the mediator for UF6 from Western Europe.
Speaking on utilization of the UF6 stock of the domestic origin (about 700 000 tons), this is obliteration of debts of previous decades when only few thought that nuclear energy is not only “cheap” power, but also an expensive waste. Depleted uranium is an analog of what happens with other nuclear waste, such as spent nuclear fuel, and of what is associated with decommissioning of nuclear plants. Decisions once postponed resulted that their price has become an intolerable burden for the industry.
Accepting the URENCO UF6 utilization cost, utilization of 1 mln tons of UF6 which Russia will accumulate by 2030 (from both domestic and abroad sources), will cost $ 5.7 bln, including $ 0.7 bln for defluorization.
Theoretically, the first possible source of funds could be sale of fluoric acid which is released in the course of defluorization. But due to economic reasons, fluoric acid does not pay for defluorization, to say nothing about storage and burial of depleted uranium. This is confirmed by industry representatives, e.g. General Director of AEChP asserts that conversion is loss-making.
Theoretically, the second source of funds should be deductions from uranium enrichment service fee. Formally, UF6 management funds are included into the uranium enrichment service cost. However, judging by the growing UF6 stock and by lack of practice for industrial defluorization of UF6, these funds are not used for the designated purpose. Moreover, it can be supposed that Rosatom has no practice for reserving funds for UF6 utilization similar to reserving funds for decommissioning nuclear plants.
But also if this fund or reserve existed, deductions, at least those from the service fee for domestic NPPs, will definitely not meet the necessary financing requirements. The cost of fresh fuel for domestic NPPs is approximately 4 – 5 times lower than the world prices which is mainly caused by low cost of enrichment which is approximately 2 – 3 times lower than the worldwide cost. Even with account for purchasing power parity and “more efficient enrichment” of uranium at domestic enterprises, the enrichment service fee for domestic NPPs definitely cannot provide for sufficient reservation of funds for UF6 utilization.
The third possible and quite realistic source of financing UF6 conversion and utilization is federal budget. It could be with high probability expected, that under conditions of scarcity of funds for building of new NPPs, Rosatom will provide conversion and storage/burial of depleted uranium by another federal target program financed from the federal budget, as it happens with financing building of new NPPs.
There is also neither information if there exist financial guarantees for utilization of depleted uranium hexafluoride, nor guarantee that the domestic system for defluorization will be launched successfully. The system launch is scheduled to take place in 5 years which, under conditions of lack of financial guarantees and other conditions, makes the issue of depleted uranium hexafluoride of international centers quite burning.
The international practice of construction of plants for uranium enrichment shows that availability of financial guarantees of UF6 utilization is an important component when applying for construction licensing. As the LES company which is a subsidiary of the West-European URENCO company applied for acquisition of a license for construction of an uranium enrichment plant in 2004 in Lea County, USA, which capacity was similar to the capacity of the planned Center based upon the Angarsk EChP, it noted reservation of $ 731 mln for utilization of 190 thou. tons of UF6 (in opinion of some experts, this figure is definitely underestimated). It should be mentioned that is was the fourth attempt of the LES company, as the previous attempts to build a uranium enrichment plant in other places failed because of public opposition. The main cause of local population’s concerns was namely the problem of storage and utilization of depleted uranium hexafluoride.
The approach chosen by the LES company clearly shows that population does not believe that enrichment plants will ensure safe storage and utilization of UF6. It is well illustrated by the UF6 stock accumulated in the USA. The public discussion around the ICUE in Russia repeats the situation with the US activities of the LES company.
The population of Russia has a right to demand for political and, which is crucial, for financial guarantees of UF6 utilization with its transferal into the safest form. Moreover, it relates to the whole UF6 accumulated: the point of the possibility to implement new projects for uranium enrichment may be raised only in case of solving the problem of conversion and safe burial of all existing stock of depleted uranium hexafluoride. The cost of the whole utilization of this stock is, according to international estimations, about $ 4.5 bln, including $ 0.6 bln for defluorization. Rosatom does not have that money.
Following these estimations, it becomes clear why nuclear industry representatives conceal the problems of depleted uranium hexafluoride utilization and why that bloody confrontation around the international centers for uranium enrichment takes place.
As for conversion and burial of UF6 of West-European origin, the cost of utilization of 125 thou. tons of this material will be 0.09 mln and 0.68 mln, respectively. Performing a calculation into revenue of enrichment plants received before additional enrichment of this material (estimated as $ 3.14 bln), it appears that it was necessary to spend 22% of the revenue for the whole UF6 utilization (defluorization + burial), and 3% - for defluorization. But, most likely, these funds were used for other expenses. It should be mentioned that a considerable part of funds received from sale of enrichment service when processing West-European UF6 (35-60%) was transferred into the federal budget or to the accounts of OAO Techsnabexport, the mediator for UF6 from Western Europe.
Speaking on utilization of the UF6 stock of the domestic origin (about 700 000 tons), this is obliteration of debts of previous decades when only few thought that nuclear energy is not only “cheap” power, but also an expensive waste. Depleted uranium is an analog of what happens with other nuclear waste, such as spent nuclear fuel, and of what is associated with decommissioning of nuclear plants. Decisions once postponed resulted that their price has become an intolerable burden for the industry.
Accepting the URENCO UF6 utilization cost, utilization of 1 mln tons of UF6 which Russia will accumulate by 2030 (from both domestic and abroad sources), will cost $ 5.7 bln, including $ 0.7 bln for defluorization.
Theoretically, the first possible source of funds could be sale of fluoric acid which is released in the course of defluorization. But due to economic reasons, fluoric acid does not pay for defluorization, to say nothing about storage and burial of depleted uranium. This is confirmed by industry representatives, e.g. General Director of AEChP asserts that conversion is loss-making.
Theoretically, the second source of funds should be deductions from uranium enrichment service fee. Formally, UF6 management funds are included into the uranium enrichment service cost. However, judging by the growing UF6 stock and by lack of practice for industrial defluorization of UF6, these funds are not used for the designated purpose. Moreover, it can be supposed that Rosatom has no practice for reserving funds for UF6 utilization similar to reserving funds for decommissioning nuclear plants.
But also if this fund or reserve existed, deductions, at least those from the service fee for domestic NPPs, will definitely not meet the necessary financing requirements. The cost of fresh fuel for domestic NPPs is approximately 4 – 5 times lower than the world prices which is mainly caused by low cost of enrichment which is approximately 2 – 3 times lower than the worldwide cost. Even with account for purchasing power parity and “more efficient enrichment” of uranium at domestic enterprises, the enrichment service fee for domestic NPPs definitely cannot provide for sufficient reservation of funds for UF6 utilization.
The third possible and quite realistic source of financing UF6 conversion and utilization is federal budget. It could be with high probability expected, that under conditions of scarcity of funds for building of new NPPs, Rosatom will provide conversion and storage/burial of depleted uranium by another federal target program financed from the federal budget, as it happens with financing building of new NPPs.
There is also neither information if there exist financial guarantees for utilization of depleted uranium hexafluoride, nor guarantee that the domestic system for defluorization will be launched successfully. The system launch is scheduled to take place in 5 years which, under conditions of lack of financial guarantees and other conditions, makes the issue of depleted uranium hexafluoride of international centers quite burning.
The international practice of construction of plants for uranium enrichment shows that availability of financial guarantees of UF6 utilization is an important component when applying for construction licensing. As the LES company which is a subsidiary of the West-European URENCO company applied for acquisition of a license for construction of an uranium enrichment plant in 2004 in Lea County, USA, which capacity was similar to the capacity of the planned Center based upon the Angarsk EChP, it noted reservation of $ 731 mln for utilization of 190 thou. tons of UF6 (in opinion of some experts, this figure is definitely underestimated). It should be mentioned that is was the fourth attempt of the LES company, as the previous attempts to build a uranium enrichment plant in other places failed because of public opposition. The main cause of local population’s concerns was namely the problem of storage and utilization of depleted uranium hexafluoride.
The approach chosen by the LES company clearly shows that population does not believe that enrichment plants will ensure safe storage and utilization of UF6. It is well illustrated by the UF6 stock accumulated in the USA. The public discussion around the ICUE in Russia repeats the situation with the US activities of the LES company.
The population of Russia has a right to demand for political and, which is crucial, for financial guarantees of UF6 utilization with its transferal into the safest form. Moreover, it relates to the whole UF6 accumulated: the point of the possibility to implement new projects for uranium enrichment may be raised only in case of solving the problem of conversion and safe burial of all existing stock of depleted uranium hexafluoride. The cost of the whole utilization of this stock is, according to international estimations, about $ 4.5 bln, including $ 0.6 bln for defluorization. Rosatom does not have that money.
Following these estimations, it becomes clear why nuclear industry representatives conceal the problems of depleted uranium hexafluoride utilization and why that bloody confrontation around the international centers for uranium enrichment takes place.
