{"id":7488,"date":"2022-07-20T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2022-07-20T01:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/?p=7488"},"modified":"2022-07-20T14:20:37","modified_gmt":"2022-07-20T06:20:37","slug":"plans-for-new-coal-plants-in-china-rebound-with-8-63-gw-approved-in-the-first-quarter-of-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/press\/7488\/plans-for-new-coal-plants-in-china-rebound-with-8-63-gw-approved-in-the-first-quarter-of-2022\/","title":{"rendered":"Plans for new coal plants in China rebound, with 8.63 GW approved in the first quarter of 2022<\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

July 20, 2022<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Beijing \u2013  <\/strong>Provincial governments across China approved plans to add a total 8.63 gigawatts (GW) of new coal power plants in the first quarter of 2022 alone, already 46.55% the capacity approved throughout 2021, new research from Greenpeace East Asia\u2019s Beijing office shows.<\/p>\n\n

\u201cBuilding more coal-fired power capacity will not provide energy security for China. This is a deep-seated falsehood. It\u2019s part of a traditional mindset about the energy sector that clawed its way back into prominence rather quickly. An overcapacity of this one energy source is a major hurdle for energy security, as well as China\u2019s energy transition. China\u2019s power inadequacies do not originate from low generation capacity. China has an overcapacity of coal-fired power plants. Power inadequacies originate from poor integration of generation, grid, load, and storage,\u201d said Wu Jinghan, the climate & energy campaigner in Greenpeace East Asia\u2019s Beijing office.<\/p>\n\n

The rate at which China approved new coal capacity dipped in mid-2021, after Chairman Xi Jinping\u2019s 2021 announcement<\/a> that the government would \u201cstrictly control the expansion of coal power.\u201d After a series of power outages across the country in the fall, however, the government began to signal a renewed focus on \u201cenergy security\u201d and \u201cenergy supply.\u201d By Q4 2021, new-approved coal capacity surged back, particularly in state-owned enterprises (SOEs).<\/p>\n\n

\"\"
Table 1<\/strong>: Coal approvals across the four fiscal quarters (2021 Q1-Q4) of 2021.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

<\/p>\n\n

\"\"
Table 2<\/strong>:The first fiscal quarter of 2022 (2022 Q1) compared to the entirety of 2021.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

In 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, newly approved non-CHP coal-fired power in six provinces accounted for 65.7% of new coal power approvals: Hunan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Fujian. On approval documents, the most frequently cited justifications for new coal capacity were the West-to-East power transfer policy, \u201ctaking advantage of local resources\u201d, \u201cupdating generation capacity to be more efficient\u201d, and \u201csupplementing shortcomings in local power generation.\u201d <\/p>\n\n

Of the twelve non-CHP (2) coal-fired power plants approved throughout 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, seven of them (totaling 10.62 GW, or 59.64% of the total non-CHP capacity approved that period) were officially approved for \u201csupplementing shortcomings in local power generation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n

\u201cEnergy security has become sort of a code word for coal, rather than for reliable supply of energy. Provincial governments look to Beijing closely for guidance. So long as \u201cenergy security\u201d is the code word for traditional, emissions-heavy economic planning, they will use it. Coal-dependent provinces need the right directions to move forward,\u201d said Wu. <\/p>\n\n

SOEs run by provincial governments are particularly responsive to short term trends in energy planning. Provincial SOE\u2019s percentage of new coal approvals (compared to national government SOEs and non-state run enterprises) decreased from nearly 60% in 2020 to 6.54% in the first three quarters of 2021, and back to 50.06% across Q4 2021 and Q1 2022. <\/p>\n\n

\"\"
Table 3<\/strong>\uff1aNew coal approvals for national-level SOEs, provincial SOEs, and non-state run enterprises in 2020,  the first three fiscal quarters of 2021 (2021 Q1-Q3), and 2021 Q4- Q1 2022.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n

The central government must get a hold on China\u2019s runaway coal expansion, either by controlling the approval process or setting up a policymaking guidance similar to a traffic light system for new coal power projects, which can communicate the severity of mounting risks to local DRCs. <\/p>\n\n

\u2014<\/p>\n\n

ENDS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

Report (in Mandarin Chinese) here<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

For media enquiries please contact:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n

August Rick, Greenpeace East Asia, Beijing, (august.rick@greenpeace.org<\/a>)<\/p>\n\n

Greenpeace International Press Desk, pressdesk.int@greenpeace.org<\/a>, +31 20 718 2470 (24 hours) <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Provincial governments across China approved plans to add a total 8.63 gigawatts (GW) of new coal power plants in the first quarter of 2022 alone, already 46.55% the capacity approved throughout 2021, new research from Greenpeace East Asia\u2019s Beijing office shows.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":32,"featured_media":7494,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"p4_og_title":"","p4_og_description":"","p4_og_image":"","p4_og_image_id":"","p4_seo_canonical_url":"","p4_campaign_name":"not set","p4_local_project":"not set","p4_basket_name":"not set","p4_department":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[18,22,100],"p4-page-type":[14],"class_list":["post-7488","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-climate-energy","tag-coal","tag-reduce-air-pollution","tag-renewable-energy","p4-page-type-press"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7488","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7488"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7488\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7497,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7488\/revisions\/7497"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7494"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7488"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7488"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7488"},{"taxonomy":"p4-page-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.greenpeace.org\/eastasia\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/p4-page-type?post=7488"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}