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state security

State Security Agency
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

24 February 2017

The Director General (Mr Arthur Fraser)

**Performance Review: Period 01 January – 24 February 2017: CDSO Co-Workers
2016 Deployment Team attached to *Braze***

1. **Purpose**

- 1.1 The purpose of this performance review is to provide documented feedback relating to the co-workers, as indicated in table 1.1, in terms of in-post training received, operational deployments and return on investment and expectations for the period 01 January 2016 to 24 February 2017, while under the operational control of *Braze*.

Table 1.1: Name list of Co-workers attached for operational control

Sno	Control Number	Cover Name
01	SO10/2/60	XXXXX
02	SO10/2/61	XXXXX
03	SO10/2/62	XXXXX
04	SO10/2/64	XXXXX
05	SO10/2/66	XXXXX
06	SO10/2/67	XXXXX
07	SO10/2/68	XXXXX
08	SO10/2/69	XXXXX
09	SO10/2/71	XXXXX
10	SO10/2/72	XXXXX
11	SO10/2/73	XXXXX
12	SO10/2/74	XXXXX
13	SO10/2/75	XXXXX
14	SO10/2/78	XXXXX

2. **Background and Explanation**

- 2.1 As part of the Chief Directorate Special Operations' mandate to impede, neutralize and advise management on threats relating to national security, force multiplication is done through the deployment of co-workers. The co-workers work under operational control of an agent handler, but remain under administrative control of the human resource

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department of the CDSO. The agent handler for the operational control of the co-workers, as indicated in Table 1.1, is **Braze**. The deployment of the co-workers is based upon an abridged and adapted "*principle agent network*" philosophy to ensure to ensure plausible deniability and cover for access, action and status.

- 2.2 **Braze** was also responsible to initially train the co-workers (as indicated in table 1.1) during the period September 2013 to November 2013 in "*Intelligence administration and collection platforms*" (IACP). The IACP equipped the co-workers with the necessary knowledge, skills and attributes to complete elementary intelligence administrative tasks (writing reports, compile submissions, writing threat analysis, initiate service request) and collect information using PESTLE as a guiding philosophy across various platforms (including human intelligence, open source intelligence, social media intelligence). The co-workers were also trained in establishing and maintaining elementary cover, level one legends and basic elucidation (interviewing) techniques.
- 2.3 The 2016 -2017 deployment year for the co-workers included 6 short term deployment periods (This was mainly due to lack of resources and registered operational projects under the domain of CDSO). All deployments were conducted in small groups (compartmentation tradecraft), with groups assigned to specific tasks and responsibilities. The deployments also coincided with continues organizational learning opportunities that were created, thereby enhancing the knowledge and skills base of the co-workers to work as a team, or as an individual. All deployments, without any exception, were characterized by high-level impact at national level and exceeded all expectations.

3. ***Operational and Performance Review***

- 3.1 The following table depicts the specific operations, including time periods, focal points, reports, learning opportunities and tangible results (Return on investment and return of expectation):

Table 1.2: Operational and performance review

Ops Focus	Period	Focal point	Reports submitted	Learning Opportunities	Results
January 8 (Rustenburg)	January 2016	Collection and countering actions	18	Report writing	Initiated 3 countering operations to impede the distribution of CR17 regalia, impede transportation system of dissident groups from GP and ensured the cancellation of the

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					<p>President's visit to Marikana after an incorrect threat assessment was provided by local and SAPS collection agents. The assessment done by the CDSO CW team provided "alternative facts" in terms of the threat on the ground. This information resulted in the Minister of State Security visiting the site and endorsing the threat assessment - done by CDSO - and thereby cancelling the President's visit due to the risks involved.</p>
SONA (Western Cape)	February 2016	Collection and countering actions	25	Cover and legends	<p>The co-workers were able to infiltrate and penetrate the leadership structure of the ZMF movement. The initial ZMF indicated that more than 5 000 people would embark on parliament, but with efficient and effective countering actions, and the dissemination of "disinformation" to supporters of ZMF, only approximately 50 ZMF supporters attended the march. This success was directly attributed to the efforts of the Co-workers of CDSO.</p> <p>The collection efforts of the CDSO also provided "alternative information" regarding the Seskhona Movement. The CDSO team was directly tasked by the Minister of State Security to "activate" the Seskhona agents to ensure a presence within the City of Cape</p>

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					Town during the SONA. This was done to great success.
ANC Manifesto (Port Elizabeth)	March 2016 to April 2016	Collection and countering actions	19	SOCMINT and elucidation	Members were responsible to identify specific names and venues of dissident groups planning to disrupt the manifesto launch. The scattered deployment of co-workers to high risk areas, and the internal negotiations with people of interest resulted in dissident groups not being transported to the event, thereby ensuring no disruptions. The co-workers also initiated a media campaign to provide positive media feedback through the placement of youths of various ethnic groups in photographic vision of media personnel, thereby promoting social cohesion. These images became a massive social trend and resulted in positive reporting.
AIDS Conference (Durban)	June - July 2016	Collection	12	Report Writing and threat analysis	Provided information to SAPS and Durban Metro relating to transport issues that ensured possible disruptions were negated. Information collected by co-workers were also used to ensure the indication of safe parameters surrounding venue and identification of criminal modus operandi in the area.
Occupy Luthuli House (Gauteng)	September 2016	Collection and countering	17	Covers and legends	The initial reports submitted by co-workers indicated the exact strength and modus operandi of the OLH

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					grouping. The reports also provided the key role players of the movement, and although these initial reports were discarded as incorrect, on the day of the event, every report submitted by the co-workers, including the numbers and leaders were proven to be correct.
SONA / Questions and Answers / Budget Speech 2017	February 2017	Collection	26	Covers and legends, rapport writing, threat analysis compilation	<p><u>Student Movements:</u> Infiltrated all WC universities and student activist groups on social networks. Obtained key information pertaining to role players and their contact details and modus operandi. Accurately estimated and assessed the presence of students during the SONA, Q&A and Budget Speech. The group informed SO20 and SO21 that no student movement threats will occur during these events, with documentary proof of these assessments.</p> <p><u>Political environment:</u> The group infiltrated and penetrated various political groups affiliated to active and passive opposition groups that threatened to disrupt the key events through disruptive actions. The assessment of information gathered on the ground indicated that the populist rhetoric used by politicians were not evident on the ground and anticipated very limited disruptions on the ground. The threat assessment</p>

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					<p>(Abridged ops reports 1.1, 1.2 and 2.1 – see attached) accurately predicted the minimal impact.</p> <p><u>Trade Unions.</u> Through penetration and infiltration operations the reports provided clearly indicated that the anticipated “section 77” notice to march on parliament during the Budget Speech, the “new federation” NUMSA, FAWU and other smaller affiliates will not materialize due to minimal support. The identification of trade unions using the “promise of jobs” if they attend the march was neutralized by disseminating countering information to affected youths. This resulted in minimal support to these marches.</p> <p><u>NGOs.</u> Active monitoring of the South Africa First, Right to Know, SAVESA, CASAC and Green Peace was done due to the penetration ability of the group. A team was penetrated and became “activist” for these NGOs. Through these actions reporting took place on supporter strengths, main actors, ideology, support structures and agendas.</p>
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4. ***Conclusion***

- 4.1 The 2016-2017 deployment year with the co-workers have proven to be exceptional in terms of operational successes achieved. The group exceeded all operational expectations and no incidents of ill-discipline or unpatriotic actions were recorded.
- 4.2 The group excelled in personal development, even during the times that administrative processes (salaries not being paid) were failing them. The team was willing to be deployed at short notice, even though their salaries were not paid due to administrative failures. They worked without any remuneration for extended periods. Their loyalty to the SSA and the country in specific is second to none.
- 4.3 As operational coordinator of the co-workers (as mentioned in Table 1.1) for the 2016/2017 year I personally have never experienced such a committed and loyal group of people. Their integrity, energy and willingness to learn have humbled me as an individual and I would personally recommend them as ***real assets to the State Security Agency.***

Kind Regards

Braze (72769-89)

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