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6 June 2017

Russel Norman
Executive Director
Greenpeace
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Dear Dr Norman

Official Information Act Request

Thank you for your correspondence received 27 February 2017 seeking the following information under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA): *"the slim file"*, held by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) regarding the Rainbow Warrior bombing.

The attached aide memoire contained on the "slim file" is being released to you. Redactions have been made under the following grounds:

1. Section 6(a)- the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand.
2. Section 6(b)(i)- the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of any other country or any agency of such a Government.
3. Section 9(2)(ba) - protect information which is subject to an obligation of confidence or which any person has been or could be compelled to provide under the authority of any enactment, where the making available of the information—
 - (i) would be likely to prejudice the supply of similar information, or information from the same source, and it is in the public interest that such information should continue to be supplied.
4. Section 9(2)(g)(i) - withholding of the information is necessary maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions by or

between or to Ministers of the Crown or members of an organisation or officers and employees of any department or organisation in the course of their duty;

5. Section 18(c)(i) - the making available of the information requested would be contrary to the provisions of a specified enactment, namely section 185 of the Security and Intelligence Act 2017 (restriction on publication and broadcasting of information regarding staff).

Where information is withheld under section 9 of the OIA, I consider that the public interest does not outweigh my decision to withhold this information in this instance.

There are good reasons to withhold the other documents contained on the slim file. These are withheld under the following sections of the OIA:

1. Section 6(a) - the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand.
2. Section 6(b)(i) - the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the Government of any other country or any agency of such a Government.
3. Section 18(c)(i) - the making available of the information requested would be contrary to the provisions of a specified enactment, namely section 13A New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 (restriction on publication and broadcasting of information regarding staff).

Please note that you have the right to make a complaint to the Ombudsman under section 28 of the OIA.


I trust the aide memoire is of use to Greenpeace New Zealand's research on the Rainbow Warrior.

Yours sincerely



Rebecca Kitteridge
Director of Security

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RAINBOW WARRIOR

Director

The folder herewith may serve as an aide memoire for those interested in the French attack on the *Rainbow Warrior*.

The commentaries are subjective distillations by [REDACTED] and me. For the annexes I have chosen activities which might form part of any terrorist operation; cooperation with our Foreign Service, the Police and Defence Forces. Also papers concerning exchanges with Liaison Services and Foreign Governments, and our assessments of threats and the operation.

Any serious student must have recourse to the base files. There were many twists and turns and some blind alleys as we felt our way towards the truth.

The operation had political dimensions which were not disclosed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Once they chose to plead guilty and accepted their sentence, we were subjected to French political and economic pressures.

I have made no reference to the Top Secret files. I suggest they retain a "need to know" status. Their contents are relevant to the circumstances of the day.

I wonder if what has been assembled is suitable for an [REDACTED] training course. The operation was one of reaction and did not allow the full range of Service capabilities to be employed. We were restricted to [REDACTED] and desk work, with limited dialogue with Liaison Services including the French. There is not a lot which could be disclosed to a third party.

The operation does allow for an interesting study in "disinformation". There was much generated from different sources at the time and later.

[REDACTED]
October 1996

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CHRONOLOGY - RAINBOW WARRIOR OPERATION

1985

- March Dominique Prieur involved in planning.
- 23 April Christine Carbon arrives Auckland and contacts Greenpeace next day.
- 24 May Carbon leaves New Zealand, possibly prematurely to avoid compromise.
- 26 May Verge arrives Noumea to arrange yacht charter.
- 7 June Verge, Bartelo, Andries and Dillais arrive Noumea.
- 11 June Maniguet joins *Ouvea*.
- 13 June *Ouvea* sails for Norfolk Island, arrives 17 June and departs for New Zealand 19 June.
- 22 June Mafart and Prieur arrive in Auckland.
Ouvea arrives Parengarenga Harbour.
- 23 June Dillais arrives Auckland, booked Hyatt Hotel 23 June.
- 24 June *Ouvea* arrives Whangaroa Harbour.
- 25 June *Ouvea* clears Customs at Opuia.
- 28 June *Ouvea* at Whangarei.
Maniguet to the South Island.
- 7 July *Rainbow Warrior* arrives Auckland.
Maniguet rejoins *Ouvea*.
Tonel and Camurier arrive Auckland.
- 8 July Equipment transfers Northland, probably to the Attack Team.
- 9 July *Ouvea* clears Whangarei.
Mafart and Prieur transfer explosives to Attack Team at Hinemoa Motel, Parakai.
- 10 July Verlet to Thames, returned Auckland 1900 hours.
Zodiac observed coming ashore at Hobson Bay at 2130 hours.
2338 hours first detonation.
- 11 July Mafart and Prieur travel to Hamilton.
Dillais, Tonel and Camurier cross Cook Strait.
- 12 July Mafart and Prieur return vehicle Auckland, interviewed by Police.
Lodged in Unicorn Motel.

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13 July *Ouvea* arrives Norfolk Island.

14 July Maniguet departs Norfolk Island for Sydney.

15 July Mafart and Prieur arrested.
Police interview *Ouvea* crew.

16 July *Ouvea* clears Norfolk Island.

23 July Mafart and Prieur formally charged with murder.
Dillais flies to Australia.

26 July Camurier and Tonel depart Auckland for Tahiti.

8 August French PM Fabius announces Bernard Tricot to conduct inquiry into *Rainbow Warrior* attack.

20 August Tricot Report published.

19 September 'Le Monde' discloses details of the DGSE operation, quoting DGSE sources.

Subsequently Director DGSE Pierre Lacoste dismissed and Defence Minister Hernu's resignation accepted.

4 November Mafart and Prieur plead guilty to manslaughter charge.

22 November Mafart and Prieur sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

1986

July Mafart and Prieur departed to serve 3 years on Hao Island.

1987


14 December Mafart returned to France.

1988

May Prieur returned to France.

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CAST OF CHARACTERS

DGSE Members in New Zealand

Recce	Christine Carbon [REDACTED]
Leader	Lieutenant Colonel Louis-Pierre Dillais [REDACTED]
Attack Team	'Peter, the sailor' Alain Tonel Jacques Camurier
Ouvea	Chief Petty Officer Roland Verge [REDACTED] Petty Officer Jean-Michel Bartelo [REDACTED] Petty Officer Eric Andries [REDACTED] Dr Xavier Maniguet
Support	Alain Mafart [REDACTED] Dominique Prieur [REDACTED]
Coordination	Francois Verlet

Principal Players - Paris

President of France	Francois Mitterrand
Prime Minister	Laurent Fabius
Minister of Defence	Charles Hernu
Director DGSE	Admiral Pierre Lacoste
Enquiry	Bernard Tricot, former Secretary-General, Elysee Palace

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RAINBOW WARRIOR

An NZSIS Perspective

1. The attack on the *Rainbow Warrior* on 10 July 1985 was the first terrorist operation in New Zealand. The attack took place without warning. Subsequently it became apparent, indicators that something was afoot did exist beforehand.
2. Apart from being a first incident, the episode was distinguished by the fact that the terrorists proved to be members of a respected Liaison Service, the DGSE.
3. What follows is a commentary on the management of the affair from the perspective of the NZSIS.

The Preliminaries

4. In 1977 Cabinet approved the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, an Officials Committee and a Terrorist Intelligence Bureau. The arrangements authorised placed emphasis on domestic hostage situations where retaliatory action by the New Zealand Police or the military would be possible. The Lawman series of exercises followed.
5. The Service took the opportunity in the aftermath of Lawman IV in 1984 to argue for a reordering of structures and methods to meet the current terrorist threats. We saw the need for command, control and response arrangements, with the flexibility to deal with an incident at home or abroad, across the full range of current terrorist techniques.
6. After a round of meetings in May/June 1985 the Officials Committee submitted to the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism in the first days of July, probably 2 July, a paper recommending the establishment of the Terrorist Emergency Group (TEG), chaired by the Prime Minister, to include both Cabinet and Officials in the one body, which would meet in the Civil Defence Command Headquarters. As part of the process, the intelligence support staff were to be moved from Police Headquarters to the Beehive.
7. Sod's law ensured the attack on *Rainbow Warrior* occurred before the Cabinet Committee met on 17 July.

8. The Cabinet Committee accepted the Officials recommendations and on 22 July 1985 they were approved by Cabinet.

9. In short the structure that would have coped better with the attack the French mounted was not in place. While Officials were aware of what was needed to manage an incident the procedures were not yet codified nor the facilities organised.

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10. The spirit of the TEG system, although accepted, was not adopted. Officials seldom met with Ministers and there was no joint staff support for the Officials in Wellington. No minutes were kept of Officials' meetings.

11. Before leaving the preliminary period, two events merit mention. It is impossible to judge now what the consequences would have been had they been known to the Police or the Service. One or other might have caused questions to be asked which, if not disclosing the impending operation to us, could have caused those controlling them in Paris to call a halt.

12. First, were the activities of the DGSE officer Bonlieu aka Cabon, who operated in Auckland in April/May 1985. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Surveillance of her movements by Greenpeace or the Service, had we been approached, might have lead to enquiries which would have caused concern in Paris and the mission being aborted.

13. Second, were the activities of the *Ouvea* crew. [REDACTED]

14. So much for the close calls and what might have been. It is relevant that if an inquiry of either the woman or the crew had lead to the mission being aborted by Paris we would never have known what we missed. The effectiveness of a Security Service's activity across the full span of its responsibilities can not always be measured.

15. The first device was detonated at 2338 hours Wednesday 10 July 1985 and the second minutes later. We embarked on our first counter terrorist operation.

The Immediate Aftermath

16. The New Zealand Police were involved within minutes. The Service was first aware of the event from radio reports the following morning, by which time Pereira's death had been confirmed. More detail became available from the media during the day. An air of uncertainty prevailed. The Prime Minister, at his first press conference, spoke of "implications of political or terrorist overtones". The Police, unknown to us, obtained their first substantial lead during the afternoon. We considered the options.

17. A meeting of the Officials Committee was called by the Chairman Gerald Hensley for late morning of Friday 12 July. We met in his 8th floor office in the Beehive. Before I left our Headquarters we had a discussion about the commitment of our resources in the event that the explosion was a terrorist attack within the meaning of our Act.


18. It was agreed we would offer [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Liaison in Auckland would be the responsibility of the District Officer Northern District (DOND) who already had professional links with the Auckland Police.

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19. At the Officials meeting it was accepted we were dealing with an act of terrorism. Subsequently the Minister was to speculate about the relevance of the definition in our Act, but the initial decision was not challenged. The Commissioner of Police reported the Police had details of a campervan which had recovered a person using a Zodiac in the Hobson Bay area on Wednesday evening. A couple had returned the van to a Newmans Depot in Auckland on Friday morning and were being interviewed. Before the meeting closed I offered Service support as agreed. I was told no assistance was required.

20. [REDACTED]

21. Within the Service, [REDACTED] packed their gear and prepared to deploy by road or air.

The Players Emerge

22. Friday, the weather was bad. By late afternoon the airports in Auckland and Wellington were closed. At home about 1800 hours I had a phone call from the Commissioner of Police. He said Police resources were stretched and the Auckland Police would like assistance. I agreed we would help and awaited a call from Superintendent Galbraith. [REDACTED] assembled at [REDACTED].

23. What transpired in the following 24 hours determined the effectiveness of the Service's intelligence contribution. Had information been transmitted accurately and fully and had there been better forward planning, events in this period could have gone differently and changed the course of the operation.

24. Superintendent Galbraith phoned with two requests. He asked for [REDACTED] checks on two individuals, the Turenges. He dictated their full names, passport numbers, date and the place of issue, Lyon. Nothing was said to indicate they were other than French citizens. He also asked that we mount [REDACTED] on a motel where the Police had invited the couple to stay while their passports were checked. His intention was that they arrive at the unit under Police escort at 2200 hours.

25. I undertook to [REDACTED] check overnight [REDACTED]. I explained the difficulties we faced [REDACTED] and he agreed the deadline be 2300 hours, a timing we could meet only if the team could fly to Auckland.

26. A check of airports showed the only prospect of flying to Auckland rested on the availability of an aircraft at Ohakea. [REDACTED] drove in that direction while I sought assistance from the Chief of Air Staff. By chance, an RNZAF VIP Cessna was at Ohakea unable to return to its base at Woodbourne because of the weather. We were promised its availability subject to the crew not having joined the Friday night happy hour in the Mess.


27. All was well, and [REDACTED] were met by the Police at Whenuapai, technically closed by weather, and reached the motel about 2245 hours. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] we did not have access to the conversations of the controllers in Paris, who it later became clear were providing guidance and support to the couple.

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28. Having launched [REDACTED] we addressed the issue of [REDACTED] checks. A message was sent to [REDACTED] Friday evening giving the detail as known of the Turenges and also a Frenchman, Francois Regis Verlet, who had been identified as visiting the *Rainbow Warrior* on the evening of 10 July, and who left later for Tahiti. We had no detail but his passport number.

[REDACTED]

30. The sequence of events on Friday evening precluded any possibility of having the Minister sign a warrant before the operation was mounted at the motel. I proceeded on the basis of a verbal understanding with the Minister at the time he assumed office. He had accepted that in the event of a terrorist attack I could act on my own responsibility and submit a warrant to him as soon as possible. The warrant was sworn on Saturday 13 July and the Minister subsequently approved it.

31. The status of the operation in the period up until the Minister signed was deliberately never examined. It was accepted the actions of the Director and the team members could only be judged in the light of events, but they would not have the automatic protection of the Act.

32. It took some days to organise properly the procedures for handling product. A Service officer [REDACTED] fluent in French but unaccustomed to transcription, undertook the task of translation. She quickly became, in addition to a competent translator of material obtained in circumstances where the Turenge couple [REDACTED] a valued commentator on their demeanour, morale and attitudes.

33. Dissemination was controlled by the Deputy Director with the agreement of the Warrant Holder and the advice of the Service legal officers. Some product was released by the Service, principally to the Police. Police practice had Superintendent Galbraith's team in Auckland controlling the investigation. Product was passed to him by DOND. Selected product was also made available to the Commissioner of Police and senior officers overseeing the operation at Police Headquarters. We were conscious of a different ethic within the Police regarding the handling of information and at times had to take steps to maintain security.

34. Others were linked to the attack within a short period.

35. The French yacht *Ouvea*, had been on the North Auckland coast since 17 June, with a crew of four Frenchmen. They had attracted attention because their behaviour did not fit the mould of the typical deep sea yachties who frequented the area. The *Ouvea* had departed Whangarei on Tuesday 9 July for Norfolk Island. On Friday 12 July the Customs Officer who had cleared her informed the Police of the details of her time in New Zealand waters and suggested the crew could be linked to the attack.

[REDACTED]

37. The Auckland Greenpeace staff recollected the activities of their French visitor Frederique Bonlieu and linked her to the operation. [REDACTED]


38. Mention has already been made of the French citizen Francois Verlet who had been on board *Rainbow Warrior* on the evening of 10 July, was quickly identified with the attack [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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39. One extraordinary occurrence was a phone message to the Northern District Office on the morning of Thursday 11 July. An individual with a French accent, using the name 'Dupont', suggested the Service check passenger lists of flights from New Caledonia and Tahiti for French servicemen who were Navy divers. The caller was never identified.

The Phoney War Period

40. Until the French Government finally acknowledged the truth after Le Monde broke their story on 17 September investigations were conducted at several levels. Legal and diplomatic exchanges with France took place [REDACTED] and on the basis that the French were cooperating with our Solicitor General and the Police.

41. We were confident of DGSE involvement within a few days of the attack, and Superintendent Galbraith stated publicly in early August that he believed the DGSE were involved.

42. To return to the chronology. As early as Saturday 13 July responses to our [REDACTED] checks and Police inquiries brought a realisation that some sophisticated false documentation had been provided for those involved in the operation.

43. [REDACTED]

44. The Turenges were arrested on charges relating to their passports on 13 July. On 14 July Police interviewed the three remaining members of the *Ouvea* crew at Norfolk Island, Maniguet having flown from Norfolk to Sydney. No charges were laid although some items were recovered from the boat. She sailed for Noumea on 16 July.

45. [REDACTED]

46. [REDACTED]

47. The Officials Committee met at intervals but there was no attempt to grip the operation and set the parameters of our response or allocate or coordinate responsibilities. Rather an attitude developed that we had two in custody and effort should be directed to their prosecution. Whether more could have been done by the Police in the early stages to apprehend the *Ouvea* crew at Norfolk or Maniguet in Sydney we can not say.

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48. At an Officials meeting the Service argued for a follow up counter terrorist operation to establish the dimensions of the attack. There was, in the weeks after the attack, the possibility that some members of the DGSE were still in New Zealand. [REDACTED]

49. The pattern of diverging attitudes and emphasis prospered.

50. [REDACTED]

51. The Foreign Service played their part convincingly, but aware of New Zealand's long term interest. [REDACTED]

52. [REDACTED] At a meeting of Officials shortly after the *Ouvea* had sailed from Norfolk, CDS advised that an Orion was airborne. We asked what it was looking for. CDS left the table hurriedly when we suggested that in addition to the *Ouvea*, the aircraft might also search for French naval vessels, not least the nuclear submarine. [REDACTED]

53. The Police diligently and effectively assembled evidence of the activities of the French citizens they had identified.

54. The three *Ouvea* crew members interviewed by the Police at Norfolk Island on 14 July departed for Noumea on the 16th. Maniguet flew to Sydney with the intention of travelling to France.

55. The Service enlisted the assistance of [REDACTED] but there were communication problems and no meeting took place. The Police were successful in interviewing him in Sydney on 16 July. Qantas declined to fly him to Singapore that evening. Maniguet arrived in Singapore, possibly on 19 July. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The expectation was that Maniguet would fly out to Paris on the evening of 21 July, giving time for a warrant to be issued for his arrest. In the event, a New Zealand journalist employed by the NZ Listener called on him at his hotel on the evening of the 19th and advised that the New Zealand paper understood that the New Zealand Police were planning his arrest. Maniguet left Singapore for Paris two hours later. So much for operational security!


56. Extensive [REDACTED] checks [REDACTED] of the three men in the boat yielded nothing of substance. The crew spoke by radio to Noumea Radio on 17 and 21 July while apparently in transit in *Ouvea*. The Service speculated about their intentions.

57. There was agreement that they were most unlikely to sail the *Ouvea* to her moorings. It was possible a relief crew would replace them and they would be spirited ashore in New Caledonia or Tahiti. [REDACTED]

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58. We were concerned, however, to cover all options. We advised Liaison Services around the Pacific Rim of the identities the three were using and their descriptions, and asked that they check flights which could be carrying them from a French possession. The New Zealand Foreign Service cooperation was outstanding. Several Heads of Mission were personally involved in passing on our requests. Many aircraft were checked but the three were not located.

59. [REDACTED]

60. [REDACTED]

Ten warrants were sworn in connection with the *Rainbow Warrior* operation. Nine involved the Turenge/Mafart/Prieur couple, some duplication being occasioned to recognise their proper names when authenticated.

61. The Service persisted with attempts to identify other players. We posed a series of questions in writing to the Police on 19 August about behaviour on the *Rainbow Warrior* prior to the attack. [REDACTED]

62. We gave advice to the Foreign Service on potential threats to their people abroad. [REDACTED]

63. [REDACTED] Branch produced an Interim Assessment for Service use on 27 August. It concluded that the DGSE had mounted the operation, Prieur was the "intelligence" officer for the operation, the inference being she was the Controller, and Mafart the "support" officer, and that the operation would have had political clearance, at least at Minister of Defence level. Later we were inclined to see Mafart as the dominant figure, but neither in command of the operation.

64. Tricot's Report of 25 August argued that the French Government had not given instructions to sink the ship. We were not alone in dismissing his findings. The information he disclosed in fact served to support the widely held view of a fully sanctioned operation. The Report did disclose the true status and identities of some of the principals.

65. [REDACTED]

66. Assertions that the CIA or British Services had or had not alerted NZSIS to the planned attack circulated widely in the international and domestic media. The Service made no comment but the Prime Minister on TV firmly dismissed the stories.

The "Real" World

67. With the French Government's acknowledgement of the role of the Minister of Defence and the DGSE, and the resignations of Hernu and Lacoste, the intelligence focus of the exercise largely disappeared.

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68. The Service continued to assist the Police in assembling evidence where liaison channels provided a convenient conduit. DOND established a close working relationship with Superintendent Galbraith and his team. In the Police fashion, the Police operation was almost totally decentralized. I visited Auckland for a Police briefing in the company of the Commissioner. [REDACTED]

69. Within the Service some very useful assessments and reports were prepared. [REDACTED] produced a very perceptive commentary on Mafart and Prieur, which [REDACTED] read with great interest. [REDACTED] Branch produced an excellent assessment of the attack plan options for the operations based on three scenarios, using the experience of a Branch member, [REDACTED]

70. The Service sought to draw lessons from the operation as the new TEG structure was developed. At an Officials Committee meeting on 18 December 1985 it was agreed papers be prepared and a decision made subsequently as to whether a report be made to Ministers. No report was produced nor was there a comprehensive debrief.

Conclusions

71. At this distance from the events of 1985, there are possibly two areas where some observations may serve a purpose - matters to do with the management of a terrorist incident, and lessons to be learned from observations at close hand of the activities of another Service in action.

Management

72. The TEG structure has slowly evolved in the fashion the Service advocated. In particular the intelligence support is organized, coordinated under Service direction and appropriately located. The question is has the thinking of Officials who direct the operation and training of the body accepted the need to train for the range of terrorist attacks New Zealand could be faced with? The Lawman series still dominates thinking, in part because of the considerable resources Police and Defence have invested in dealing with hostage situations.


73. There is on the *Rainbow Warrior* file a copy of the letter we wrote in 1989 to the Coordinator ODESC at the time a BA Concorde lost half its rudder while crossing the Tasman. The event provided all the ingredients for a "terrorist bomb attack" Command Post Exercise which, by dealing with a real set of circumstances, could have provided valuable lessons. [REDACTED]

74. I think we cannot rest assured that what Cabinet approved in 1985 has been implemented until the diversity of the terrorists techniques have been recognised and some serious consideration has been given to their implications for TEG.

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The DGSE

75. The DGSE operation was a strange mix. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The females' surnames were wrongly entered, the passports for the couple should have had consecutive numbers, and apparently no attempt had been made to backstop them in the event of inquiries being made. [REDACTED] There was similar carelessness about their French driving licences.

76. The three *Ouvea* ratings had uniformly new and unused passports. They put their cover in jeopardy when they asked for receipts for trivial amounts.

77. It may have been necessity or ingrained habit that caused the Turenges to face up at the Newmans depot and ask for a refund of their rental fees. Accounting for expenditure is very important but there must be a time when a member of the Service or an agent spends as if they are using their own money.

78. The behaviour of the couple when first interviewed by the Police indicates there was no predetermined plan for damage control. It seems probable Sophie (Dominique Prieur) was destabilised by the killing of Pereira. The couple had the opportunity on the Thursday to leave the country after abandoning their vehicle. Her behaviour on the Friday night/Saturday gave the impression she was facing a situation she had not contemplated. She immediately sought [REDACTED] directions from Paris. [REDACTED]

79. It does raise the question whether she was a late substitute? There was not an easy rapport between the couple. Was she on the mission against the better judgement of her controllers because no other substitute was available when the original contender fell out? It could explain why there is a gap of one number between their passports.

80. What was the explanation for Maniguet's presence? It has been suggested that the rules may have required a commissioned officer to be in the boat. It could be he was permitted to leave at Norfolk because the boat was to be scuttled shortly thereafter. His earlier intention to fly out of New Zealand could have been when the plan called for the boat to be scuttled off the New Zealand coast, an arrangement which would have avoided the crew members being exposed to questions on Norfolk after the bombing.

81. [REDACTED]

82. Finally, "unique" is a word to be used sparingly. A terrorist attack [REDACTED] mounted in Auckland in circumstances where there was no New Zealand national interest directly involved must be close to unique.

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