

Minerals for Energy Transition

Guiding Principles

GREENPEACE

Introduction

Minerals such as lithium, nickel, copper, and cobalt – often called “transition minerals” or “critical minerals”^{*} – are playing an increasingly pivotal role globally. These minerals have many different uses across the economy, which include renewable energy and electric transport. Industries and governments are concerned about the supply of such minerals in the future.¹

The use of these minerals must be prioritised for a fast, just, and green energy transition away from fossil fuels. At the same time, the current economic model — focused on constant growth and resource extraction — needs to shift toward one that is sustainable, fair, and stays within the planet’s limits.

There are many solutions that reduce mineral demand and the need for mining. These include sufficiency measures such

as improved public services, measures to increase efficiency, technological substitutions, and circularity policies and investments that extend product lifespans and generate new mineral supply through recycling. However, even with these solutions, studies project that some new mining will likely still be necessary for the energy transition².

As mining continues to pose significant risks to ecosystems, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities, mining must not occur within no-go zones and environmental impacts must be minimised, with companies acting responsibly and respecting human rights.


The purpose of these principles is to set out a pathway for ensuring that the supply and use of transition minerals is both just and equitable, and they can be adapted into local contexts.

^{*}Other terms include “energy transition minerals” (ETMs) or “critical energy transition minerals” (CETMs). Governments, industry and organisations like the International Energy Agency tend to use “critical” or “strategic” minerals. In some cases, ‘Critical Minerals’ could imply that other resources (e.g., water) are not critical. The term also feeds a narrative that justifies trade-offs when there is opposition to “critical” development. In this document, we use “critical minerals” in contexts that may extend beyond transition purposes.



Which minerals are most important for energy transition technologies?

These minerals are key examples of those considered “critical” for energy transition technologies and infrastructure. They are mined and processed in a wide range of geographies.




Where in the world?

Critical minerals are found globally. This map shows countries with the highest reserves* of select minerals.


Global Reserves for Select Minerals

(United States Geological Survey, 2025)⁵


Global Lithium Reserves





Global Nickel Reserves



Global Cobalt Reserves



Global Copper Reserves



Nickel mine located in the mega biodiversity area in Raja Ampat District, West Papua, Indonesia.

© Greenpeace



Artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC.

© Amnesty International



Indigenous community member discusses lithium mining in Jujuy, Argentina.

© Amnesty International



*Deposits classified as "reserves" means they are currently economically feasible to extract. Reserves numbers change over time as deposits are discovered and developed.⁴


Examples of Mineral Mining Impacts, Amounts, and Uses Globally

Lithium

Salt brine mining in and around the drought-prone Andes evaporates millions of litres of water from the arid ecosystems.⁶ Many Indigenous communities are adversely affected. This can also lead to tensions and conflicts within and between communities.⁷

Besides transition use, Lithium is also used in pharma, electronics, glass, and ceramics.⁸

Amount mined in 2024:
0.24 million tons⁹





Aerial view of lithium fields in the Atacama desert in Chile, South America. ©Shutterstock

Cobalt

Many small scale facilities in the DRC can lack safety measures. Workers suffer fatalities, accidents, and serious health issues. Workers can include children as young as seven years old.¹⁰

A major non-transition use of cobalt is superalloys for military and aerospace.⁸

Amount mined in 2024:
0.29 million tons⁹



Artisanal miners load cobalt ore to a truck in the DRC. ©Afriwatch 2020



Nickel

Strip-mining extraction and processing in Indonesia is driving deforestation and coastal waters/reef pollution. Mining is also leading to land grabbing, Indigenous and labour rights violations, and corruption.¹¹

High-GHG emitting captive coal power plants are increasingly powering nickel smelting and processing.¹²

The production of stainless steel is a major non-transition use of nickel.⁸

Amount mined in 2024: 3.7 million tons⁹



Satellite image of PT. Trinusa Mining Services, Sulawesi, Indonesia
©2025 Maxar Technologies / Google


Copper

It has been reported that copper mining to date has generated almost half of global tailings.¹³

Tailings are a type of mine waste resulting from the extraction of many different minerals. Some pose significant risks to people and the environment, and need continuous risk mitigation.¹⁴

Non-transition uses of copper include construction⁸ and jewelry.

Amount mined in 2024: 23 million tons⁹



Mount Polley, Canada, pictured one month after its tailings dam failed in 2014, releasing mine waste into Polley Lake, Hazelton Creek watershed, and Quesnel Lake.
© Terrasaurus Aerial Photography Ltd

Minerals and Geopolitics



Governments, notably the U.S. and in Europe,¹⁵ are reshaping critical minerals supply chains. They are attempting to expand mining in their territories (and others) amidst geopolitical tensions to compete with other nations.¹⁶ This is likely to shape the future of mineral supply chains in the long term.



The military is another non-energy transition market for a number of minerals considered 'critical'. Many of these minerals are used to build munitions, jets, tanks, or specialised equipment.¹⁷

Left: ©Shutterstock
Right: ©Unsplash

Future supply and demand for minerals depends on choices made today

Many projections outline significant growth in demand for transition minerals in the coming decades.¹⁸ These projections are then used to justify expansion of mining.

Yet demand projections are highly variable, and are likely to evolve over time. They depend on many assumptions – about societal changes, future technologies, policy, and circularity.¹⁹

As a result, the extent of future demand for these minerals is uncertain and likely to change from current estimates. Choices that governments and industries make today and in the future can reduce demand, and the need for mining.²⁰

Factors that are likely to affect supply and demand for minerals significantly include:



Ambition on climate policy and speed of travel, and the scale and speed of investment in less mineral-intensive solutions like public transport.²¹



Investment in energy-related technologies and circularity. Using different battery chemistries, improving the performance of current technologies, improving recycling rates and better reparability and reuse of products could all reduce mineral demand.²²



Systemic shifts in society can reduce excessive demand for minerals, energy, land, water and other natural resources. This is sometimes called 'sufficiency', which aims to decrease the need for resources overall in an equitable manner through structural changes and policies.²³

Greenpeace's Guiding Principles on Minerals for Energy Transition

The principles outlined in the following pages present a pathway for ensuring the just and equitable use of minerals for a fast, just, and green energy transition. Reducing demand, and finding alternative supplies where available (for example through circularity and recycling) are key parts of this.²⁴

Governments must play an important role through policy, regulatory, and accountability measures for mineral use and sourcing. Companies should act responsibly even if States lack the ability or willingness to protect and respect human rights and the environment.

Recognising that each country and community has unique realities shaping feasibility and impact, the following principles can support energy transition when adapted into local contexts.



1. Minimise Warming to no more than 1.5°C *The Guiding Star*

Limiting global warming to no more than 1.5°C is critical for the sake of climate, nature and humanity. As such, minerals must be prioritised for energy transition above other non-essential uses.




2. Find Just and Equitable Solutions *The Foundation*

Justice and equity is foundational to energy transition and must be embedded in all the related solutions for the use and sourcing of minerals.



3. Reduce Demand *Use Less*

Slowing mineral demand growth is essential. There are many ways to reduce demand, such as improving public services and transport, fostering sharing and reuse, enhancing the efficiency of technology, and substituting technologies.



4. Source from "Above Ground" *Use What we Already Have*

Recycling must become a preferred source of transition minerals in the coming decades. Recycling infrastructure, incentives, and supporting policies must be key priorities for governments to maximise this supply.



5. Protect Sensitive Areas, and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities *Restrict Mining*

Mining and ore processing activities continue to pose serious risks to people and the environment. "No-Go Zones" should be off-limits, and stronger protections are needed to prevent harm. The rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities must be respected.



1. Minimise Warming to no more than 1.5°C

The Guiding Star

It is imperative that the world limits global warming to no more than 1.5°C for climate, nature and humanity. As such, minerals use and sourcing must serve a swift phase out of fossil fuels.

Fortunately, the quantities of raw materials needed in a renewable energy system (minerals) are much smaller than in a fossil fuel-based energy system (gas, oil, and coal).²⁵ And unlike fossil fuels, transition minerals can be reused and recycled repeatedly in a circular economy.²⁶

Most critical raw materials are used not only for green energy and transport, but also in military equipment, and everyday items like portable electronics. **Prioritising current and future mineral use for a green energy transition** is crucial – for example in regions where the coal phase out is a top priority – unless there is a strong reason not to, such as for some health applications²⁷.



2. Find Just and Equitable Solutions

The Foundation

Embedding justice and equity in every aspect of using and sourcing minerals – from reducing demand, to recycling and mining – is foundational for achieving a just energy transition.

The energy transition must not deepen global inequality by exploiting the Global South to fuel the Global North's shift to green energy. Solutions must tackle global injustices, including the uneven risks and benefits of mineral use and sourcing. Affected people must have a real voice in decision-making, international human rights must be respected, and strong, enforceable standards and transparency measures must be put in place.

Where mining does take place, the countries and communities endowed with these resources must be the ones to benefit the most.

Left: Community leader advocates for equity in Vanuatu. ©Arlene Bax/Greenpeace
 Right top: Fighting inequality in Manila. ©Jilson Tiu/Greenpeace
 Right bottom: Youth advocate for justice in Tanzania. ©Magsman Media/Greenpeace

2. Find Just and Equitable Solutions

The Foundation

This principle incorporates the following:



2.1 Equitable approaches:

Minerals sourcing and use must be fair and just. For example, high-consuming countries should focus on reducing mineral demand and maximising recycling before looking to mining domestically or abroad. Where mining does take place, mineral-rich nations and regions should benefit the most, including through clean, equitable local development.



2.2 Inclusive development:

Decision-making must actively involve Indigenous Peoples and local communities impacted by energy transition development. Their rights, cultures, and traditional lands must be respected and preserved.²⁸ This includes seeking current and retroactive Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and ensuring their other rights under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and under domestic and international law.



2.3 Human rights and safety standards:

Whether companies focus on mining, recycling, or manufacturing, all of them must ensure they respect human rights, including the right to a healthy, clean, and sustainable environment.²⁹ In addition, business enterprises must ensure their suppliers at all stages of

the supply chain uphold labour and safety rights.³⁰ This includes paying fair living wages, fair compensation to workers for occupational diseases and injuries sustained while at work and for loss or damage to property, and freedom of association and collective bargaining. This also means ensuring suppliers involved with private security respect Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' rights. Employment practices should also promote equity, diversity, and inclusion.



2.4 Effective governance:

State authorities must establish robust legal and regulatory frameworks.

This includes mandatory international standards and incorporating best possible anti-corruption standards. Standards should enforce effective environmental and social protections across supply chains and address power imbalances between corporations and communities. They must also ensure local and national economic benefits from energy transition development. Industry must work with governments to follow international law and best practices, while exercising thorough due diligence. These frameworks support community wellbeing and sustainable development.³¹ Importantly, corporate responsibility to respect human rights stands regardless of whether States are able—or willing—to fulfil their own human rights obligations.³²



2.5 Transparency and Access to Justice:

Transparency is an essential component of

accountability and building trust. There are many steps between mining and making a solar panel, and then later recycling it. Transparency at the individual steps, and throughout supply chains, is an essential part of an accountable system. This includes accessible chains of custody and beneficial ownership information. States must require companies to establish open and accessible reporting mechanisms for communities, for example, to monitor water use, or track the environmental and social impacts of mining or processing. Transparency measures adopted by companies should not substitute the actions required to uphold their responsibility to respect human rights. Companies should also put in place robust grievance mechanisms, respecting the Århus convention and Escazu agreement, and other national and international law.³³ These should allow communities to report any concerns so they can be resolved promptly and fairly. These measures will ensure that affected communities have a voice, and access to justice.³⁴ Moreover, institutional access to justice for all affected people must be guaranteed at all times.



Technology repaired. ©Unsplash

3. Reduce Demand Use Less

For a just energy transition, governments should prioritise slowing mineral demand growth, especially in the Global North. All actors must avoid overstating demand, which could lead to unnecessary extraction and investment. This approach will reduce the pressure on Earth's systems, vulnerable ecosystems, and communities facing urgent risks.³⁵ It is important that demand reduction considerations are equitable, considering local development needs and historic material use.

To use less, sufficiency and efficiency are useful concepts. They are distinct yet complementary, and both are crucial.

Sufficiency

Reduces the need for resources overall

- Avoids excessive demand for materials, energy, land, water and other natural resources.
- Delivers a decent living standard for all within planetary boundaries.³⁶
- Emphasises an equitable approach to the use of resources.

Efficiency

Enhances the effectiveness of resource use


- Optimises the use of resources to achieve the same level of output with less input.
- Focuses on improvements that enhance productivity and reduce waste.
- Makes the best possible use of available resources and reduces the demand for new resources.

Reducing demand can happen through:



©Paul Langrock/Greenpeace

3.1 Systemic Changes



Economies designed to be less dependent on growth while also embracing sufficiency,* will help to reduce excessive energy and material needs while improving social wellbeing.³⁷

3.2 Substitution




Technical innovation can remove or reduce the need for certain materials in products, such as new battery chemistries or alternative technologies.³⁹

3.3 Efficiency



Using materials and products efficiently reduces the volume of recycled and raw materials needed. This includes designing products for highest performance, durability, longevity, and reparability.

*Sufficiency measures include ensuring everyone's access to basic needs, regulating wasteful production, fostering sharing economies, improving public services and infrastructure, and increasing public and active transport. These can reduce consumption of natural resources, and less mining needs to happen as a result.³⁸



4. Source from "Above Ground"

Use What We Already Have

Recycling must become a key source of transition minerals in the coming decades. Compared to mining, recycling 'above-ground' supply can significantly decrease environmental and social impacts.⁴⁰

Potential sources include spent batteries, production wastes, household e-waste, and industrial scrap piles.

Recycling of EV batteries has the potential to reduce new mining significantly.⁴¹

In one scenario, annual lithium, nickel, cobalt, and manganese demand for use in certain EVs could be reduced by up to 28% by 2050 through recycling.⁴²

To ensure ample 'secondary' supplies,⁴³ collection and recycling levels* for key products must be maximised.⁴⁴ Recycling infrastructure, incentives, and supporting policies must be key priorities for governments.

*Collection rate is the percentage of a technology or infrastructure retiring that is collected and eventually recycled. Material recovery is specific to a particular mineral (e.g., lithium) and is typically expressed as a % of mass recovered in the recycling process.

Top: recycled battery materials. ©Ascend Elements
Right: lithium ion battery recycling. ©Ascend Elements
Left: Electronic waste recycling, India. ©PradeepGaur/Shutterstock

Above-ground ('secondary') supply is supported by:



4.1 Maximising reuse, repurposing, and recycling:

Governments must demand strong circularity standards for collection, recovery and reuse of products and materials. This may include targets for levels of recycled materials in new products.

Stringent Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) regulations would require manufacturers to retain responsibility for their products throughout their lifecycle. Producers should establish processes for collection and valuable material recovery. They should also design products for easier reuse and repair, and provide take-back schemes for recycling.

Measures like Battery Passports, which are documents with lifecycle battery data and tracing could support these goals. Their aim is to ensure transparency and accountability in the recycling process. Battery Passports are required in the EU starting in 2027, and increasing recycled content will be required in batteries (e.g., 16% recycled cobalt content by 2031, increasing to 26% in 2036).⁴⁵



4.2 Addressing barriers to recycling at scale:


This may involve improving recycling technologies, or streamlining collection and processing systems. It may involve governmental incentives for businesses to invest in recycling infrastructure and innovation. Consumer awareness of, and participation in, recycling programs is also essential.

Lithium ion battery recycling to date has focused on recovering only a narrow range of high value metals. Widening the range of metals recycled, while maximising recycling efficiencies, are part of this effort.⁴⁶



4.3 Evaluate the risks of mining tailings:

Tailings are waste materials left after minerals are extracted from ore, and could offer a potential source of minerals,⁴⁷ but the feasibility and risks remain uncertain. Further study, and application of the precautionary principle, is essential to understand amounts available and the related risks of development, which could be similar to primary mining.⁴⁸



An Indigenous man photographs a map of traditional land, Southwest Papua, Indonesia.
©Jurnasyanto Sukarno/
Greenpeace



5. Protect Sensitive Areas, and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

Restrict Mining

There are many global initiatives pushing for improved mining practices.⁴⁹ Despite these, mining and ore processing activities continue to pose serious risks to people and the environment, including from human rights abuses and toxic pollution.⁵⁰

Mining activities include prospecting, the expansion of existing operations, and development of new areas. To address these serious risks, when sourcing transition minerals the Precautionary Principle⁵¹ should be applied through the protection of 'No-Go' Zones and rights, and rigorous social and environmental due diligence assessments. These requirements must be followed:

5.1 Protect 'No-Go' Zones.

5.2 Respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

5.3 Companies must act responsibly, preventing and mitigating environmental damage and impacts, and respecting human rights.

5.1 Protect 'No-Go' Zones

These include:

1) Protected Areas and areas recognised by international conventions and agreements: all categories, including IUCN protected areas I-VI, Indigenous Protected Areas (IPAs) and community conservation and protected areas (ICCAs), World Heritage Areas, Ramsar sites, UNESCO Global Geoparks and Biosphere Reserves.

2) High Conservation Value (HCV) areas.⁵² These are areas with biological, ecological, social, or cultural significance, including Intact Forest Landscapes (IFLs – HCV2). They are identified as having one or more of the following six HCVs: species biodiversity, landscape-level ecosystems, habitats, ecosystem services, community needs, and cultural values. These areas need to be appropriately managed to maintain or enhance their intrinsic values.





3) High Carbon Stock (HCS) areas.⁵³ This refers to areas of vegetation or soils, particularly forests, that have high amounts of stored carbon. These areas act as carbon sinks, absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it in their biomass and soil. They also serve as a proxy for high biodiversity. HCS areas include all tropical primary forests, mangroves, and high-biomass peatland soils. Other forests, such as

old growth boreal forests, as well as certain wetlands or grasslands are also potential HCS areas. Protecting HCS areas is crucial to maintain their carbon storage capacity and prevent the release of stored carbon into the atmosphere.

4) Significant natural ecosystems. This includes coral reefs, and the deep sea where a moratorium on deep sea mining is essential. Scientists still have much to learn about the ancient, as-yet untouched ecosystems of the deep ocean. Other ecologically important natural grasslands, wetlands, mangroves, shrublands, and savannah systems⁵⁴ can be misinterpreted as having little value, and must be evaluated for significance in local contexts.

5) Critical water bodies. These include all rivers, lakes, glaciers, significant streams, and other types of water bodies or drinking water supply sources, as well as a buffer zone that is sufficient to ensure their protection.

6) Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' territories. These include traditional and customary lands, waters, deep ocean areas, coastal and communally-owned areas, and the natural resources on which they depend, where their free, prior, and informed consent has not been obtained.



Top Left: Forest in Indonesia. ©Ulet Ifansasti / Greenpeace. Top Right: Forest in DRC. ©Greenpeace / Kate Davison. Middle Left: Deep sea dwelling Umbrella Octopus ©Blue Planet Archive / David Wrobel. Middle Right: Peatland Forest in Indonesia. ©Will Rose / Greenpeace. Bottom: River in the Amazon Rainforest, Brazil. ©Valdemir Cunha / Greenpeace.



5.2 Respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

Indigenous Peoples and local communities have customary rights, whether legally recognised or not, over their lands and resources. These rights⁵⁵ – including to traditional territories, waters, coastal and communally-owned areas, the natural resources on which they depend, as well as their cultural rights – must be respected through applying the principle of free prior and informed consent (FPIC)* in advance of all mining-related activities. This includes rights to determine priorities for the development or use of such lands and resources, and to the use of traditional knowledge. In the case of the traditional territories of uncontacted or voluntary isolation communities, these areas should be off-limits.

*Many local communities are “tribal peoples”, “traditional communities”, “local resource dependent communities” or other categories of local communities that have collective decision-making processes and hold a strong collective connection to, and cultural reliance on, customary lands or natural resources. For these categories of local communities, FPIC is required to be applied as per Indigenous Peoples. This however in no way undermines the self-determination, non-discrimination, and collective rights basis of FPIC of Indigenous Peoples. In cases where the local community groups in question do not have collective rights and governance structures, the use of the concept FPIC, which is a collective decision-making right, would be inappropriate, and alternative concepts such as informed consultations leading to broad community support, should be considered.



Governments, companies and society must protect sites of cultural, religious or spiritual significance to Indigenous Peoples on land and in the ocean. Protection of these sites must be agreed according to ILO Convention 169⁵⁶ and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.⁵⁷

Economic objectives must not overshadow the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities living in or near mining areas. Companies should bear the costs of all short and long term mining impacts on communities. They should also uphold the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights⁵⁸ through human rights due diligence processes.⁵⁹ Indigenous Peoples and local communities living near mining should have access to relevant grievance mechanisms.⁶⁰

Photo left: Indigenous Hawaiians protest against Deep Sea Mining.

© Marco Garcia / Greenpeace

Photo right: Sami 'No Consent No Access' Banner in Finland.

© Jani Sipilä / Greenpeace


5.3 Companies must act responsibly, preventing and mitigating environmental damage and impacts, and respecting human rights.

Mining's legacy of harm to ecosystems and people cannot continue. Companies engaged in mining and ore processing activities must follow all local, national and international laws. They must be transparent about their operations, finance, beneficial ownership, human rights and social due diligence, and supply chain information. It is widely recognised that business enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights⁶¹ – this is independent from States' ability and willingness to protect human rights.⁶²

In advance of any mining-related activity, companies and governments must assess the ecological capacity of ecosystems to continue to sustain life, and minimise disruption in sensitive areas. This must include the consideration of cumulative effects, which are the combined impact of multiple extraction activities over time and space on the environment and local communities.

Mining and ore processing must also decarbonise, using renewable energy to power operations. Minimising energy, water, chemical, and material inputs during mining and processing is essential. Continuous rehabilitation of mining sites should be managed using adequate policy, regulation, and finance instruments including bonds and legacy funds.⁶³

All companies making products that contain these minerals should seek to improve business practices relating to the extraction and use of these raw materials. Enforcing comprehensive international due diligence requirements with regular third party audits can help ensure that transition minerals do not cause or contribute to adverse social, environmental, and human rights impacts.⁶⁴



Office building ©Unsplash.
Forest ©Răzvan Dima/Greenpeace.

What are the solutions to reduce the need for mining?

Sufficiency

This means a decent living standard for all while reducing the total energy and material needs across economies.

For example, rather than a “like for like” replacement of internal combustion engines with EVs, overall reductions in car use can be achieved by investing in more efficient and less energy intensive mobility options (e.g., affordable and accessible public transport).



Substitution

This removes or reduces the need for certain minerals in products by using different types of technology or energy solutions.

Lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries require neither nickel nor cobalt. LFP improvements have led to reductions in projected EV nickel demand,⁶⁶ and now make up about half of the global EV battery market.⁶⁷



Efficiency

Investments in this area can increase products' longevity and help technologies do the same or better job with less materials.⁶⁵

Today we need less material input for the same battery performance – this must continue to improve through research and development efforts.



Recycling

Compared to mining, recycled supply has far fewer environmental and social impacts⁶⁸ and should be maximised.

Programs and policies, such as minimum recycled content regulations and extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, can boost recycled supplies.⁶⁹



Top left: EV bus, Indonesia. © Dentjes/Shutterstock. Top right: Lithium-ion High-voltage Battery Component for Electric Vehicle. © IMimagery/Shutterstock. Bottom left: Powdered, recycled Lithium iron phosphate cathode material, to make new lithium ion batteries © Unsplash. Bottom right: Conveyor belt carries batteries to be 'wet shredded'. © Ascend Elements

Endnotes

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